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This study is an investigation of the legality 
of the dismissal of a teacher/coach from only the 
interscholastic coaching responsibilities. 
As long as American society is considered "sports 
minded," coaches will be examined by those individuals 
who feel qualified to determine the staffing and con­
duct of interscholastic sports programs. The typical 
process of community, parental, and administrative in­
volvement with interscholastic sports has allowed the 
peripherally involved to approach, criticize and eventu­
ally ask for the dismissal of coaches not meeting cer­
tain expectations. 
After an extensive study of the historical and 
legal aspects of teacher/coach dismissal, the following 
conclusions were drawn: 
1. All indications lead one to believe that 
there will be continuous legal activity 
concerning the employment of teacher/ 
coaches and their dismissal. 
2. The nature of the educational function 
does not lend itself to new areas of 
legal questioning; therefore, it is 
predictable that the same attempts 
to challenge due process will continue 
to appear. 
3. Forces such as the questioning atti­
tude of the public and an increased 
awareness of individual constitu­
tional rights are affecting teacher 
rights and working conditions in 
America today as never before. 
4. Litigation of teacher/coach dismissal 
issues in North Carolina has been in­
frequent. To date, there are less than 
five on record. 
5. In nineteen states teacher/coaches do 
not have due process as coaches. 
6. As of 1985 thirty-four states do not 
grant tenure as a coach. 
7. Intentional discrimination must be 
proved when a disparate racial or 
sexual impact is achieved when 
hiring, promoting, transferring, or 
firing employees. 
8. Most states have basically followed 
the same pattern in utilizing div­
isible contracts for teacher/coaches. 
That is, separate contracts are signed 
for the teaching and coaching respon­
sibilities . 
9. Due process must be adhered to in 
teacher/coach dismissal proceedings. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I have always resented coaches who filed 
suit, but now I feel that I do not have 
any alternative — I am not eager to plead 
the situation^through the media. The courts 
will suffice. 
Coach "Chuck" Mills 
This statement by Chuck Mills, former football 
coach at Wake Forest University, cited in Sports and 
The Courts by Herb Appenzellar and Thomas Appenzellar 
typifies the position taken by most coaches — they 
prefer not to appear in court. They would rather 
be on the playing fields and in the gymnasiums com­
peting in the athletic arena. 
Coaching is an occupation that leaves one 
constantly vulnerable to criticism. In America's 
increasingly litigious society, more and more ath-
letic-oriented cases are appearing in the courtroom. 
These cases may involve academics, admissions to 
colleges and universities, athletic equipment and 
1 
Herb Appenzellar and Thomas Appenzellar, 
Sports and The Courts (Charlottesville, Virginia: 
The Michie Company, 1080), p. 151. 
2. 
fields, discipline, athletic injuries, and many 
other things. But the majority tend to involve 
some issue that deals with employment. 
For years both state and federal courts have 
tended not to override the discretionary responsi­
bilities of local school boards when it comes to 
personnel matters. Consequently, local school 
boards have enjoyed considerable freedom in affairs 
that deal with employment, assignment, nonrenewal, 
suspension, transfer and dismissal of teachers and 
coaches. However, in recent years, courts have be­
gun to require school boards to be more reasonable 
2 
in their dealings with personnel. 
Herb Appenzeller has looked at coaching issues 
that pertain to employment of coaches. He maintains: 
The majority of lawsuits involving coaches 
deal with some area of employment. Coaches 
frequently go to court when discrimination is 
attributed to racial or sexual bias. They 
also seek judicial relief in cases pertaining 
to tenure, dismissal, divisible contracts and 
defamation of character.^ 
2 
Herb Appenzeller, Sports and Law (Charlottesville, 
Virginia: The Michie Company, 1985), p. 79. 
3Ibid., p. 151. 
3 , 
The very survival of athletic programs depends on 
the ability of personnel to remain responsible for their 
actions. It stands to reason then that the evaluation of 
coaches is more important than ever before. 
Effective coaching is a concern of most school 
superintendents, high school principals, athletic 
directors, and coaches. What are the qualities demanded 
in effective coaches? Often coaches are asked to be ex­
pert teachers and tacticians as well as trainers, coun­
selors, disciplinarians, and acceptable role models. 
Most of the time a knowledge of public relations, moti­
vation, learning readiness, training techniques, motor 
learning, and maturity rates is a must. Coaches are 
also expected to attend professional clinics or work­
shops. Winning is often emphasized as a criterion 
for evaluating secondary school coaches. 
Certainly evaluation of coaches in their perfor­
mance of coaching duties needs no defense. It is no 
less important than the evaluation of any other school 
program. Positive evaluation demonstrates that the 
school system is responsibly using tax dollars. 
4. 
Constant evaluation is vital to both administrator 
and teacher/coach. Periodic exchange may help the em­
ployee and employer avoid unpleasant situations. Then 
again, situations may develop that lead to dismissal 
proceedings. A good evaluation includes both judg­
mental and developmental features. Judgmental evalua­
tion concentrates on past performance and seeks to re­
ward improved performance. Developmental evaluation 
concentrates on improving future performance through 
4 
self-learning and growth. 
Therefore, one aspect of this study will be to 
consider the issue of teacher/coach evaluations in the 
dismissal procedure. Whether evaluation of the dismissed 
coach has been done in a professional manner may be a 
question. Whether or not proper due process has been 
afforded the coach with regard to the evaluation may be 
another. 
There are many reasons why coaches have been 
relieved of coaching duties. No attempt in this 
study will be made to examine each and every one of 
4 
John VJ. Gratto, "Competencies Used to Evaluate 
High School Coaches," Journal of Physical Education 
Recreation and Dance (V. 54 No. 5, May 1983) p. 59. 
5 „ 
them except as they may bear on the issue of dis­
missal. A look at some of the issues and an exam­
ination of the legal implications for school admin­
istrators and boards of education forms the basis for 
this study. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to determine the 
legal issues involved for boards of education and 
school administrators when a teacher/coach is dismissed 
from his coaching position but not his teaching position. 
The available court cases were analyzed for the possible 
consequences and implications. This study is being 
developed in a factual manner and will deal with the 
legal questions and the extent to which these have been 
challenged and litigated. 
QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
Some very basic questions relating to the topic of 
study which will be answered are: 
1. What are the major legal issues regarding 
teacher/coaching assignments? 
2. Which of these issues are most often 
included in court cases related to the 
dismissal of a teacher/coach from his 
coaching responsibilities? 
6 
3. Which of the legal principles established 
by the "landmark" decisions regarding 
teacher dismissal are applicable to legal 
issues involving dismissal from coaching 
responsibilities? 
4. Based on the results of recent court cases, 
what specific issues related to teacher 
dismissal from coaching assignments are 
being litigated? 
5. Can any specific trends be determined from 
an analysis of the court cases? 
6. Based on the established legal precedents, 
what are the legally acceptable criteria 
for the dismissal of a teacher/coach from 
his coaching responsibilities? 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This is a historical and legal study of the legal 
ramifications of the dismissal of a teacher/coach from 
only his coaching responsibilities in the public schools 
of the United States. The research describes the extent 
to which these dismissals have been challenged and liti­
gated, the reasons for the litigation, the results of the 
major court cases, and the possible effects these court 
decisions will have on school boards and school officials. 
The major thrust of the research is directed to­
ward the legal aspects of litigation related directly 
to the dismissal of a teacher/coach from the coaching 
position. 
7. 
METHODS, PROCEDURES, AND 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The basic research technique of this historical and 
legal study is to examine and analyze the available 
references concerning the legal aspects of the dismissal 
of a teacher/coach from the responsibility of coaching. 
In order to determine if a need existed for such 
research, a search was made of Dissertation Abstracts 
for related topics. The researcher did not find any 
dissertations that addressed the issue of teacher/ 
coach dismissals from a legal perspective. Journal 
articles related to the topic were located through 
use of such sources as Reader's Guide to Periodical 
Literature, Education Index, and the Index to Legal 
Periodicals. 
General research summaries were found in the Ency­
clopedia of Education Research, and in a review of re­
lated literature obtained through a computer search from 
the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC). 
Federal and state cases related to the topic were 
located through use of the Corpus Juris Secundum, Amer­
ican Jurisprudence, the National Reporter System, and 
the American Digest System. Recent court cases 
were found by examining case summaries contained in 
issues of the NOLPE School Law Reporter. All of the 
8 
cases were read and placed in categories corresponding 
to the issues noted from the general literature review. 
In using these sources one should consult with a 
reference law librarian and a legal secretary for 
appropriate guidance. 
Other references included books, journal articles 
and newspaper articles. Information obtained from per­
sonal interviews is also presented in this study. 
DESIGN OF STUDY 
This study is an investigation of the legality of 
the dismissal of a teacher/coach only from coaching re­
sponsibilities and has been carried out by an analysis 
of cases related to the subject matter that have been 
litigated. Chapter One will serve as an introduction 
which will describe the study. 
Chapter Two contains a review of related litera­
ture. In addition to a review of the literature 
dealing specifically with the legal aspects of the 
dismissal of a teacher/coach from coaching responsi­
bilities, this chapter includes a summary review of 
the general educational research on teacher/coach 
dismissal. 
Chapter Three includes a narrative discussion of 
the major legal issues related to the dismissal of a 
teacher/coach from the coaching position. An attempt 
is made in this chapter to show the relationship between 
9 
the legal issues and the major educational issues 
identified in the reviews of the literature in the 
previous chapter. 
Chapter Four contains a general listing and a 
narrative discussion of the recently litigated 
court cases which contain some references to the 
topic of teacher/coach dismissal. The first cate­
gory of cases includes those United States Supreme 
Court landmark decisions relating to such broad 
constitutional issues as the legality of divisible 
contracts, racial and sexual discrimination, and 
due process of law. The other categories of cases 
selected for review in this section include those 
related to teacher/coach dismissal. 
The concluding chapter of the study, chapter 
fivev contains a review and summary of the information 
obtained from the review of the literature and from 
the analysis of the selected court cases. The 
questions asked in the introductory part of the study 
are reviewed and answered in this chapter. Finally, 
legally acceptable criteria for the dismissal of a 
teacher/coach from coaching responsibilities are 
included. 
10 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
For the purpose of clarification, the following 
terms used in this study are defined: 
Secondary school teacher/coach. This term will 
designate a contracted teacher who is also assigned 
the responsibility of athletic coaching. 
Teaching contract. This is the legal contrac­
tual-document, entered into by the state and the in­
dividual teacher, which establishes the basic terms 
of employment for teaching. 
Divisible contract. This is a contract that is 
divided into more than one part. There is usually a 
part which pertains to teaching duties and another 
part which pertains to other assigned duties (in this 
case, coaching responsibilities). 
Indivisible contract. This is a contract that is 
singular in nature. There is only one part which 
specifies the duties of the contracted party and the 
responsibilities of the state. 
Extra-curricular assignments. These are the 
assigned activities outside the regular course of 
study or beyond the limits of the teaching duties. 
11 
Teacher tenure. This means that a teacher has 
successfully experienced a trial period and now enjoys 
more permanence in the position. 
Due process. This means the legal steps and 
measures to which a person is entitled to protect him­
self and his interests. 
Racial discrimination. This means to make a dis­
tinction or make a difference in favor of or against 
someone because of his or her race. 
Sex discrimination. This means to make a dis­
tinction or make a difference in favor of or against 
someone because of his or her sex. 
The legality of the dismissal of a teacher/ 
coach from his coaching position has become a more 
litigous question in recent years. During the 
sixties, seventies, and now into the eighties the 
courts have handed down more teacher/coach dismissal 
decisions than in the previous decades of the 
twentieth century. The level of legal action now 
appearing in the courts is indicative of the times 
and reflects the urgency of the need for appropriate 
professional activity between boards of education and 
teacher/coaches. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
OVERVIEW 
The literature regarding the role of the teacher/ 
coach addresses the issue of performance in both areas 
However, desirable as it may be, the teacher/coach 
may be unable to give his or her best effort to these 
dual role responsibilities.* 
What does seem to be most important is to be suc­
cessful and thus to fulfill the expectations of sig-
2 
nificant others in the school and community settings. 
According to Charles Hungerford, the hiring pro­
cess plays a large role in establishing the prospec­
tive coach's attitude toward his teaching and coaching 
1 
Thomas J. Templin and Jeff Washburn, Winning 
Isn't Everything...Unless You're the Coach," Journal 
of Physical Education, Recreation and Dance 52 
(November-December 1981):16. 
2Ibid., p.16. 
13 
While all conflicts in the teaching/coaching issue 
may never be eliminated, they may be improved upon 
in the hiring process when the following are con­
sidered: 
- Philosophy of the community/school 
- Philosophy of the physical education and 
athletic programs 
- Written job descriptions 
- Review of candidates 
- Involvement of other teacher/coaches in 
the selection process 
- Conditions of employment 
- Orientatio^ of new personnel 
- Evaluation 
Hungerford further observes that although it may 
be possible for many persons to. teach and coach com­
petently, exemplary dual role performance may be un­
realistic for individuals on whom pressures of coaching 
weigh most heavily. Thus, it is not surprising that 
4 
many teacher/coaches retreat to the coaching role. 
In Athletics and the Law, Herb Appenzeller goes 
beyond the questions of hiring practices and observes 
that on the secondary level, many teachers and coaches 
are beginning to sue school boards when their contracts 
3 
Charles W. Hungerford, "Hiring Physical Educators 
and Coaches," Journal of Physical Education, Recreation 
and Dance 52 (November-December 1981):19. 
^Ibid., p. 20. 
14, 
are terminated. A 1973 case is typical of the latest 
5 
trend that is developing in such situations. 
In the case of Hoover v. Lexington Board of Edu­
cation et al^ Wayne Hoover had coached for 21 years in 
North Carolina. For eight years he had served as a 
director of physical education, a social studies teacher, 
basketball coach and golf coach. When the Lexington 
School Board fired him by a 3-2 vote, Hoover filed a 
$150,000 lawsuit against the school board, superin­
tendent, and principal. Hoover charged the defendants 
7 with denying him his right of due process. 
After Hoover was called before the Board to dis­
cuss his coaching ability, not his teaching record, 
the Board voted 2-2-1 to rehire him. The school 
attorney interpreted the tie as favorable to Hoover, 
but Robert Morgan, North Carolina's Attorney General, 
8 
considered it a mandate for dismissal. 
A final hearing was held and Hoover was offered 
the position of "probationary teacher," which he re­
jected. He insisted that he qualified for the pos-
ition of "career teacher" due to his length of service. 
^Herb Appenzeller, Athletics and the Law, 
(Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1975), 
p. 6. 
^Hoover v. Lexington Board of Education et al, 
253 S 73 (1973). 
^Idem. 
^Ibid. 
^Ibid. 
15, 
Following a civil action suit in the United 
States District Court, a consent order was entered 
into by Mr. Hoover, plaintiff and the Lexington City 
Board of Education, et al, defendants, which stipu­
lated: the plaintiff shall resume teaching duties 
on September 24, 1973, with the City of Lexington, 
North Carolina, Administrative School unit for the 
entire school year, 1973-74, with full pay from 
10 
August 13, 1973, through the end of the school year. 
The Hoover case is typical and Appenzeller ob­
serves in Sports and the Courts that the majority of 
court cases involving the coach come under the heading 
of tenure and dismissal. Many coaches insist that 
they are teachers and should be protected by teacher 
tenure acts. Situations that center around dismissal 
raise questions of due process and the legality of 
divisible contracts. When a coach is fired or his 
salary is reduced, the school officials' authority to 
sever the contract is often challenged and the court 
11 
usually becomes the arbitrator in such a situation. 
Public school coaches in most instances are hired on 
1 0  
Consent Order, The United States District Court 
for the Middle District of North Carolina Salisbury 
Division, September 24, 1973. 
11 
Appenzeller, Sports and the Courts, p. 160. 
16 v 
contracts that are separate from the teaching contract. 
As such, the school system can terminate a coaching 
contract at the end of an academic year for little or 
no reason. Many coaches insist that they are teachers 
and should be protected by teacher tenure acts. Situ­
ations that center around dismissal raise questions 
of due process and the legality of divisible contracts. 
A common allegation is that the coach failed to receive 
due process of the law and guarantees of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
It may well be that modern-day coaches will spend 
many hours preparing for their most important contest 
ever, one that will be contested in the courtroom and 
13 
not on the playing field. 
Another case, found in Appenzeller's Sports and 
the Courts, illustrates the charge of due process vio­
lation and occurred in Florida in 1972 at the collegiate 
level. 
*^Idem., p. 79. 
13Idem., p. 151. 
17 
14 
In Parker v. Graves John Parker, a law student 
and part-time assistant for the University of Florida Ath­
letic Department, became embroiled in a campus-wide con­
troversy that led to his dismissal. Parker became the 
spokesman for a group of disgruntled athletes who formed 
an organization known as the League of Florida Athletes. 
The athletes tried to alter the athletic department's 
rules regarding dress and grooming. 
Parker wrote several articles in the school paper 
criticizing the athletic department's rules. After the 
articles appeared in the school paper, Parker's super­
visor recommended his dismissal. The assistant athletic 
director charged Parker with failure to enforce regula­
tions concerning dress codes, grooming and quiet hours 
in the athletic dormitory. The athletic director met 
with Parker in the presence of a university official 
and dismissed him for conduct disloyal to the athletic 
program. He contended that Parker's personal views 
seriously conflicted with his assignment in the athletic 
department. 
The controversy took place during a disappointing 
football season and increased tension among athletics 
and coaches alike. While some athletes supported the 
14 
Parker v. Graves, 340 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Fla. 1972). 
18. 
articles, others bitterly resented them and insisted 
that they did not reflect the views of all the athletes. 
In addition, the unfavorable publicity created by the 
articles caused prospective athletes to turn down visits 
to the campus and adversely affected the recruiting-
Parker instituted a lawsuit claiming that he 
had been denied his right of free speech and expression 
as guaranteed by the First Amendment. The United States 
District Court, however, viewed the plaintiff's conduct 
as divisive since it created: 
Serious disciplinary problems and discord 
within the University Athletic Association 
which disrupted the orderly and efficient 
administration of the athletic department. 
The court held that the plaintiff was disloyal to 
the athletic director by failing to carry out the respon­
sibilities for which he had been employed. It did not 
believe that his right of free speech had been violated. 
It favored the defendants by concluding with a statement 
from the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Epperson v. Arkansas in which the high court said: 
Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the 
daily operation of school systems and which 
do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values.^ 
*^Idem.,p. 161. 
16 
Idem., p. 162. 
Though this case did not invoive the dual role 
issue as clearly as many secondary school cases, 
it establishes some of the issues involved in cases 
dealing with coaches. 
In Richards v. Board of Education Joint School 
17 
District No. 1, City of Sheboygan , a basketball 
and cross-country coach taught driver education. He 
received $10,472.00 for teaching and $980.00 for his 
coaching duties. At the end of the school year the 
superintendent issued him a new contract to teach, but 
not to coach. The superintendent told him that he had 
taken this action because of numerous complaints about 
his coaching, but refused to disclose the nature of 
these complaints. The coach was granted a hearing and 
disputed the charges against him. He sued the school 
district for allegedly failing to provide him due process 
and raised the following questions: 
1. Is the refusal to disclose the reasons 
for dismissal a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
2. Did the school board violate state law by 
failing to give him a notice in writing 
that he would not be assigned an extra­
curricular activity? 
17 
Richards v. Board of Education Joint School 
District No. 1, city of Sheboygan, 206 N.W. 2d 597 
(Wis. 1973). 
20 
The court referred to a previous case in which a 
school librarian was fired. In that instance the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin made a strong statement 
regarding a school board's power to dismiss a non-
tenured employee. It emphatically said: 
The right to hire carries the concomitant 
right to fire - this power may be exercised 
by the board arbitrarily and without cause. 
The question in the coach's case was whether the 
school board violated his rights by issuing him a con­
tract that did not include coaching duties. The school 
district noted that the coach was employed as a teacher 
(for which he was certified) but that he was not re­
quired to be certified to coach. It reasoned that he 
was therefore not entitled to a hearing. 
The court commented that the school board had not 
maligned the coach's reputation in any way and that he 
was free to seek employment elsewhere. It affirmed the 
action of the school board in retaining him to teach 
driver education, but releasing him as the basketball 
, 19 
coach. 
*®Idem., p. 163. 
19 
Idem., p. 163. 
21 
Coaching As Teaching 
An important article by Karl Lindholm discusses 
the relationship between the coaching and teaching 
roles. Clearly, at the very core, coaching is teaching. 
Playing fields are classrooms of great possibility, and 
every coach is a teacher. Teaching the skills and broad 
strategy of a game they enjoy, coaches foster learning 
and achievement in a competitive atmosphere. In the 
contemporary situation, a coach who is centrally con­
cerned with the total development of his youthful 
charges will face some formidable challenges and real 
20 
pressures. 
The coach indeed faces conditions other academicians 
can avoid. In few other professions are one's skills 
and performance evaluated in so public and simplistic a 
fashion. It is a common though unfortunate tendency 
for one to look merely at a coach's won-lost record to 
judge his success. Wins and losses in the academic 
classroom are certainly registered more subtly. Joseph 
Margolis, athletic director at Brooklyn College, has 
written, "Unfortunately, the pressures and demands on 
many coaches have caused them to subvert these [educa­
tional] values and betray the virtues attributed to 
21 
sports to achieve the bottom line — winning." 
2(karl Lindholm, "Coaching As Teaching: Seeking 
Balance," Phi Delta Kappan 50 (June 1979): 734. 
21Ibid., p. 735 
Lindholm further maintains that inconsistency 
threatens the coach from within and inhibits the real­
ization of balance. The forces that threaten him 
from without are even more challenging. The obsessive-
ness of American society's attachment to sports is a 
powerful obstacle to the teaching coach and his efforts 
to develop a healthy sporting environment. Americans 
take their sports so very seriously, grimly exhorting 
their teams to be "Number One." A coach can bring a 
sane, balanced attitude to the playing field only to 
have it sabotaged by his players and their parents and 
fans. As Americans are all well aware, sports in America 
constitutes a powerful social, cultural and commercial 
force. At the highest levels, the commercial nature 
of sports introduces a hardcore pragmatism that filters 
22 
down and affects young players and their mentors. 
Coaches themselves often pay lip service to broad 
educational goals; few will admit to narrow-mindedness 
in their approach to games, yet many display it. One 
constantly find schools- and school leaders who espouse 
participatory and educational goals with regard to 
sports, while their teams and coaches reflect a victory-
23 
at-all costs approach. 
2 2  
Ibid. 
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Ibid. 
23. 
This overemphasis, though hardly a new phenomenon, 
must be addressed. It is the obligation of schools and 
their leaders to let coaches know clearly what the values 
of the institution are and where the leaders stand in 
24 
relation to these values. 
Teacher/Coach Role Conflict 
An article that treats the conflicts of teacher/ 
coaches is that of John Massengale. He notes that in 
addition to the apparent socialization from athletic 
participation, the majority of teacher/coaches are 
formally educated in physical education. Compared to 
other prospective teachers, physical education majors 
have a more traditional philosophy of education, have 
a slightly lower social class background, tend to be 
more dogmatic, and appear to have different social 
25 
values. 
This uniqueness may be a product of a specialization 
process within the professional teacher preparation 
program. Earning an academic degree or teacher certi­
ficate does not ensure professional preparation in 
coaching. Consequently, the aspiring teacher/coach 
may be well prepared academically but may lack coaching 
26 
preparation. 
24 
Ibid. 
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John D. Massengale, "Researching Role Conflict," 
Journal of Physical Education, Recreation and Dance, 
52 (November - December 1981):p.77. 
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In an article from Physical Educator Thomas 
Templin and Joseph Anthrop enlarge on the compromises 
that some teacher/coaches make. As the teacher/coach 
is socialized to prioritize his primary role as the 
director of winning teams, he also learns that such 
a commitment is justifiable if one is to survive pro­
fessionally. It is justifiable even if it is to the 
detriment of the individual's performance as a teacher 
which becomes, of course, a source of major criticism 
27 
by one's colleagues. 
The pressures of winning influence teacher/coaches, 
especially those involved in the "major" sports, to 
make a larger commitment to coaching. Again the indiv­
idual is placed in a delicate position. If he is ex­
pected to win, above all else, sacrifices and compromises 
must be made. It is here where conflict may be heightened 
as the individual selectively monitors and perhaps alters 
those attitudes and behaviors that one might normally 
2 
model under different circumstances or role expectations. 
Locke and Massengale in their Research Quarterly 
article comment on the problems of coming to terms with 
valid evaluation of performance. Certainly the folklore 
of physical education and athletics contains a rich 
_ 
Thomas J. Templin and Joseph L. Anthrop, "A 
Dialogue of Teacher/Coach Role Conflict," Physical 
Educator 38 (December 1981) :p.185. 
28 
Ibid. 
source of stories concerning the legendary teacher/ 
coach who with athletic teams performs outstanding 
feats of instruction exceeding (by process or pro­
duct criteria) those found elsewhere in the school, 
but who, when confronted with an academic class, 
is ineffective or, in the case of a physical educa­
tion class, "rolls out the ball" and retreats to the 
office to diagram plays. Significantly, stories 
of teacher/coaches who neglect their teams in order 
to prepare for other instructional tasks do not exist. 
Locke and Massengale also focus on a key pro­
blem of the teacher/coach. He is an expert in 
teaching sport skills in the varsity situation, yet 
often he is assigned to teach a subject where 
class conditions (numbers, ability and motivation of 
students) demand a considerably different set of 
30 
abilities and interests for effective teaching. 
Many coaches are distressed by the feeling that 
their interests and abilities are not well matched 
to the demands of teaching. A surprising number of 
teacher/coaches admit concern over the feeling that 
the quality of their teaching performance is impaired 
31 
by the additional demands of coaching. 
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Lawrence F. Locke and John D. Massengale, "Role 
Conflict in Teacher/Coaches," Research Quarterly 49 
(May 1978) :p/165 
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Ibid. 
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In the Journal of Physical Education, Recreation 
and Dance, Suzi Olcot enlarges on the eventual role 
the administrator must play in the situation of a 
problem coach. Often teacher/coaches who concentrate 
more on their coaching, yet who may be tenured as 
teachers, find themselves being asked by school 
administrators to either develop a more professional 
approach to their teaching assignment or give up 
their coaching so that this interference with their 
32 
teaching will not be existent. 
Olcot further notes that the public holds the 
coach in high esteem, providing the best possible 
circumstances for success and an arena in which to 
display coaching talents. The coach faces the 
challenge of preparing the best possible team. Every­
one needs achievement and community. An athletic 
team offers a chance to achieve and a team with which 
33 
to identify. 
^Suzi Olcot, "The Administrator's Role in Creating 
a Positive Direction for the Teacher/Coach," Journal of 
Physical Education, Recreation and Dance 52 (November -
December 1981): p.21. 
Teacher/Coaching Issues 
In Sports and the Courts Herb Appenzeller discusses 
34 
Wright v Arkansas Activities Association a case which 
shows how the due process may be a crucial question in 
resolving problems arising with the teacher/coach. In 
this case the Arkansas Activities Association investi­
gated a report that a football coach had illegally con­
ducted off-season football drills. After the investi­
gation, the association placed the high school on pro­
bation with the stipulation that it could not compete 
35 
unless it fired the head football coach. 
The coach sued the association because it enforced 
a rule that was allegedly vague and too broad, thereby 
violating his right of due process. He pointed out 
that the rule did not specify that a coach could be 
fired for violating the provision regarding off-season 
practice. The district court agreed with the coach 
and so ruled. The association immediately appealed 
3 6 
the decision to a high court. 
The association based its argument on previous 
judicial decisions in which municipalities were found 
not to be "persons" and subsequently received immunity 
from lawsuits. The judge took exception to this inter­
pretation by stating that the association was not 
34 
Wright v. Arkansas Activities Association (AAA) 
501 F. 2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974). 
35 
Appenzeller, Sports and the Courts, Pp. 163-164. 
28 
created by state statutes and therefore could not 
37 
claim the protection of immunity. 
The United States Court of Appeals supported 
the judge by ruling that the association, just as a 
person, was subject to the provisions of Section 1983 
of the Civil Rights Act. It held that the association 
was also involved in state action which made it subject 
to regulations regarding violations of rights protected 
by federal law. It found the Arkansas Athletic Associ­
ation to be guilty of arbitrary action toward the 
coach and urged it to warn coaches of possible penalties 
in the future. The court felt that it was not an unfair 
burden to expect the association to clarify the regula­
tions that would state that individuals, as well as 
3 8 
institutions, could be penalized for rule infractions. 
Appenzeller discusses in Physical Education and the 
Law Richards v. Board of Education Joint School District 
39 
No. 1, City of Sheboygan a case involving free speech 
issues. The particular case also shows the complications 
which result when coach-administration conflicts become 
a topic for public discussion. 
A successful and popular coach became very un­
happy when he was not named athletic director when 
37 
Idem 
38-j Idem 
39 
Richards v. Board of Education Joint School 
District No. 1, City of Sheboygan, 206 N.W. 2d 597 
(Wis. 1973). 
this position became available. From the time he 
was bypassed for the job, he reportedly refused to 
support the school administration. The defendant 
school board decided not to renew his contract, and 
the teacher/coach sued on the basis of "constitu­
tionally impermissable reasons." He charged that 
the board refused to rehire him because he pro­
tected students under his care from faculty mis­
treatment, that he objected to verbal abuse from 
spectators against an athlete (his son) and that his 
40 
right of free speech was violated. 
The defendants replied that an Arkansas law 
vested power in the school board to do whatever it 
41 considered best for the benefit of its students. 
The United States District Court of Arkansas 
did not agree with the plaintiff's arguments and 
commented that he was unhappy and discontented be­
cause another man was given the position he wanted. 
It concluded that from the time he was denied the 
position, he showed a lack of control and failed to 
cooperate with the school officials and in general 
"created an intolerable situation for the athletic 
director, the principal, the superintendent and the 
40 
Herb Appenzeller, Physical Education and the 
Law, (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 
1981) p. 86. 
41 
Ibid. p. 87 
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school board," The court reasoned that the plain­
tiff apparently decided that he would leave sooner 
or later but wanted the public to recognize the 
injustice that was put on him. As a result he was 
the center of turmoil. The board realized that he 
was a popular coach and tried to keep him until 
it felt that the situation had deteriorated enough 
that they had no choice but to dismiss him. 
The Federal court upheld the school board's 
decision not to renew his contract when it commented: 
It is a sad story. But it is the type 
of problem that confronts school boards, 
unfortunately, on not infrequent occa­
sions — the type which usually involves 
the entire school community. This parti­
cular school community has finally re­
solved the problem. It cannot be said 
that it did so in an unfair or arbitrary 
manner. The matter should therefore re­
main at rest. 
The following cases are interesting and 
illustrative of alleged constitutional right's 
violations. 
In Shimoyama v. Board of Education of Los Angeles 
43 
Unified School District the coach taught biology and 
physical education at Chatsworth High School in Lbs 
Angeles, California. He also coached football from 
44 
1970 until 1978 and track for the 1979 season. 
43 
Shimoyama v. Board of Education of Los Angeles 
Unified School District, 174 California Reporter 748 
(Cal. App.) 
44 
Herb Appenzeller,Physical Education and the Law, p. 87. 
In June, 1978 Shimoyama met with his principal 
and assistant principal to discuss his unauthorized 
purchase of new football jerseys and the major 
change in team colors. The principal cited a lack 
of communication between the two and the fact that 
Shimoyama did not follow policy and procedures in 
45 
ordering equipment. 
Shimoyama responded with a letter that de­
nounced the principal. He sent copies of the letter 
to the district superintendent, booster club presi­
dent, the assistant football coach and two faculty 
i 
members who were active in the United Teachers of 
Los Angeles. He blamed the principal for low morale 
at the school and accused him of failing to support 
46 
the athletic program. 
The principal replied that the letter was full 
of inaccurate statements that did little to improve 
communications between the two, and then informed 
Shimoyama that he could not work with him as coach. 
The parties agreed, however, that the coach needed to 
apologize and retract his adverse statements against 
the principal. In return the principal would per­
mit him to coach the football team and reevaluate 
his performance and make a decision about his status 
47 
as coach after the season was completed. 
45 
Ibid. 
46 
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47 
Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
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In November the principal informed Shimoyama 
that he would not be reassigned as football coach 
for the following reasons: 
1. A lack of communications existed 
between them. 
2. The coach used an ineligible player 
in a practice game. 
3. The coach lost his temper and grabbed 
the face masks of players. 
4. The coach used profanity. 
5. The coach's conduct resulted in 
penalties by the officials. 
6. The coach ordered materials without 
regard to school policy. 
Shimoyama contended that he was dismissed as 
football coach because he exercised his right of 
free speech guaranteed by the first amendment and 
charged the principal with violating his right 
of due process. 
The court in Shimoyama v. Board of Education of 
Los Angeles Unified School District^ a case that 
considered the testimony and made an interesting ob­
servation when it said: "Although discussions among 
the faculty of a high school no doubt permit a 
greater flexibility of expression then the para-
48 
Ibid. 
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Shimoyama v. Board of Education of Los Angeles 
Unified School District, 174 California Reporter 748 
(Cal. App.). 
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military atmosphere of a police department, still 
the necessities of harmonious working relationships 
51 
and employee discipline are the same." 
It then found that the trial court made the 
right decision in denying the plaintiff's petition 
to be reinstated as coach by concluding: 
If attacks upon a superior such as we 
have here were given constitutional 
protection, it would require a hardy 
administrator indeed to maintain 
working relationship and to risk 
criticizing a subordinate's perfor­
mance, knowing that the subordinate 
was free with impunity to retaliate 
by broadcasting accusations implying 
that the administrator was a conspir­
ator, a liar and a hypocrite. 
53 
In Knapp v. Whitaker we find a case that 
deals with the right of a teacher to speak on mat­
ters of public concern as guaranteed by the first 
amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Terry Knapp was a high school teacher and coach 
who filed a lawsuit against the Peoria School Dis­
trict Number 150, the superintendent, principal, 
assistant principal and later the assistant super­
intendent. Knapp claimed that the defendants had 
"retaliated against him for exercising his first 
54 
amendment rights." 
51 Ibid. 
52 T i  •  j  Ibid. 
53 
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Knapp v. Whitaker, 577 F. Supp. 1265 (C.D. 111. 1983) 
54. 
In 1980 the teachers in the Peoria School Dis­
trict were negotiating for collective bargaining, 
and a key issue was the grievance procedure. Knapp 
asked a member of the school board if he could dis­
cuss the grievance procedure, and she invited him 
to talk with several members of the board. The 
board was anxious to have input on the issue from 
teachers. Knapp discussed issues involving class­
room assignments, curriculum, evaluations, lia­
bility insurance and mileage reimbursements. At 
no time did any administrator or board member tell 
Knapp that it was against policy for teachers to 
55 
talk with board members. 
In March, 1981, Knapp filed a grievance based on 
unequal mileage reimbursement for coaches and lack 
of liability insurance for coaches who drove stu­
dents to athletic events. Knapp's grievance was 
denied, and he tried to get a board member to 
sponsor him so that he could meet with the entire 
board to explore the denial of his grievance.^ 
56Ibid., p. 89. 
35 
In April, 1981 the superintendent pointed 
to a regulation in the superintendent's contract 
that required all communication to go to the board 
through him. The superintendent reprimanded Knapp, 
who replied that such a policy violated his right 
of free speech. The superintendent responded, 
"Your rights end where my nose begins." Knapp 
was then placed in "remediation category," which 
57 
is one step above termination. 
On June 16, 1981 Knapp was unwillingly re­
placed as coach, allegedly because of his phle­
bitis condition, and in the fall his paid study 
hall was taken away. At the end of the year he re­
ceived a second negative evaluation and was trans-
58 ferred from the high school to a grade school. 
A jury awarded Knapp'over $500, 000 in com­
pensatory damages, and the defendants appealed. 
59 
In Knapp v. Whitaker, (C. D. 111. 1983) , the court 
observed that the policy of reporting to the board 
through the superintendent was unconstitutional. 
It commented that the plaintiff was never 
informed that his conduct violated school board 
57 
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policy. The court stated that the plaintiff's 
action was not compelled by personal interest 
alone, but a desire to discuss the issues on 
behalf of other teachers in the district. The 
court upheld the lower court's huge award by 
finding that the teacher's "criticism of the 
grievance procedure was protected speech. 
The case of McGee v. South Pemiscot School 
61 
District R-V deals with the right of a coach 
to speak publicly on controversial athletic issues 
John McGee, a teacher and junior and senior high 
school track coach, received a satisfactory eval­
uation from his principal and public praise from 
three school board members a month before his con­
tract was to be considered for renewal. A public 
controversy developed when a divided school board 
voted to discontinue the junior high school track 
program. The decision became the key issue in a 
hotly contested school board election. Three 
board members insisted that McGee had recommended 
the elimination of the junior high school track 
program, an allegation the coach denied. Four 
61 
McGee v. South Pemiscot School District R-V 
712 F. 2d 339 (8th cir. 1983). 
days before the election McGee wrote a letter to 
the town newspaper outlining his reasons for 
keeping the junior high school track program. 
His letter created considerable controversy in 
,  ,  . .  6 2  
the community. 
Following the school board election, renewal 
of McGee's contract was denied. McGee claimed 
that his dismissal was a result of the letter he 
wrote to the newspaper and a violation of his 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 
McGee testified that he received a letter from 
the superintendent stating that the "letter was 
6 3 an act of disloyalty and warranted his dismissal. 
Three members of the school board, who voted 
against the coach, cited their displeasure with his 
ability to "work with the athletic director, keep a 
tidy classroom, and his having bought track uniforms 
without asking the proper authorities." McGee 
testified that he paid for the uniforms with his 
6 2 , .  ,  
Ibid. 
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own money. The other board members, who voted in 
favor of the retention of McGee, reportedly com­
mented that they would now vote against him 
because he could not follow directions. The ath­
letic director testified that McGee could not 
effectively work "within the school's bureaucracy." 
A trial court jury found that the school board 
had violated the coach's rights as protected by 
United States Supreme Court 1983 and awarded him 
$10,000 in damages. The district court, however, 
4 
granted the defendant's motion for a judgment non 
obstante veredicto (which overrules the jury's 
verdict). The United States Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit, reviewed the testimony and, in 
McGee v. South Pemiscot School District R-V,^~* 
commented that the jury had the responsibility 
of deciding whether McGee's letter created 
the dissension between the coach and his immediate 
superiors. It also said: "The record suggests 
that McGee is a good teacher. He organized a 
popular and successful track program from scratch. 
64
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McGee v. South Pemiscot School District R-V, 
712 F 2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983). 
39 
All the parties seem to agree that he is enthus-
6 fi 
iastic and committed to the welfare of his students." 
The court of appeals reversed the district court's 
verdict of non obstante veredicto and "remanded it 
with instructions to enter judgment on the jury 
verdict, "thus reinstating the $10,000 damages award 
116 7 
to the coach. 
One of the judges vigorously dissented and 
pointed out that firing was the best thing that 
could have happened to McGee. He explained that 
McGee accepted a position in another district for 
a higher salary and was also employed as a full-
time minister at a local church. The dissenting 
judge could not support McGee's contention that 
he had suffered "mental anguish and loss of repu­
tation" in light of his new employment. The dis­
senting judge also emphasized that McGee only 
sought $7,000 in damages, but the jury awarded 
him $10,000.68 
Another case, Vail v. Board of Education of Paris 
69 
Union School District No. 95 illustrates the alle­
gation by a coach that his right of due process was 
violated. The coach argued that the fourteenth amend­
ment to the United States Constitution guaranteed him his 
^Ibid., p. 90 
67 T V. ,  Ibid. 
68 t ,  .  ,  Ibid. 
^^Vail v. Board of Education of Paris Union School 
District No. 95, 706 F. 2d 1435 (7th cir. 1983). 
right of due process.^ 
A search committee for the Paris Union School 
Board visited a successful coach-athletic director 
with the intention of hiring him to build a winning 
program. The coach requested enough time to build 
a successful program at the school and discussed 
job security before he agreed to leave his present 
job. The board hired him as football coach and 
athletic director with the agreement that he would 
have two years to improve the program. After one 
year, however, the board terminated his position 
without giving him an explanation as to the reason 
for firing him and failed to provide a hearing for 
the coach. The coach challenged the board's de­
cision, arguing that he was assured of two years 
in this position. The United States Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Curcuit, in Vail v. Board of Edu­
cation of Paris Union School District No. 95, (7th 
Cir. 1983), upheld the judgment of the lower court 
and affirmed the award in damages of $19,850.99 
71 
for "unlawful termination." 
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Another case mentioned by Appenzeller in Physical 
Education and the Law illustrates the questions raised 
by a situation in which a coach desires to be relieved 
of his coaching duties but to retain his teaching job. 
In this New Jersey case, two teachers, Richard Dombal and 
Donald Doolittle, requested extra pay for coaching 
and, when the board refused, submitted their resig­
nations from their coaching responsibilities. The 
teachers complained that they were forced into in-
4 
voluntary servitude and sought help from the federal 
court. The court dismissed the case but recommended 
that the plaintiffs go to an advisory board for a 
hearing. The advisory board upheld the teachers' 
position but the board of education rejected the 
decision and a federal court, under a new complaint, 
upheld the school board. The court referred to a 
previous New Jersey case as to the basis for its 
72 
decision. In Re Rutherford Education Association 
the question of whether a teacher could refuse to 
work with extracurricular activities was decided 
in favor of the school district. The court ruled 
that extracurricular activities were part of the 
educational program of a school and one that was 
not negotiable. 
72 
In Re Rutherford Education Association, P.E.R.C., 
No. 77-17 (N.J. 1976). 
42 
In the present case, it was said that the. 
decision in Rutherford was still valid and it did 
not give a teacher the right to refuse a coaching 
73 
assignment. The duties must be accepted. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Brown v. Board of 
74 
Education of Morgan County School District held in 
1977 that a school district had the right to dismiss 
a teacher who resigned his position as coach when 
his contract called forkboth teaching and coaching 
duties. The court stated that the exception to the 
policy would be left to the school board, if for 
some reason it decided to divide the contract. 
Since the school board refused to separate the 
teaching and coaching duties, the court upheld the 
board's decision to rule that the teacher had in 
75 
effect resigned his contract to teach and coach. 
Teachers frequently ask what the law requires 
when administrators add extra duties to their regu­
lar teaching assignments. Practices and policies 
vary with school systems regarding financial supple­
ments as well as reduced work loads and other admin-
7 ft istrative procedures. 
73 
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75Ibid., p. 86. 
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Another case, McCullough v. Cashmere School Dis-
77 
trict 222 of Chelan County, from Physical Education 
and the Law deals with the same problem of undesired 
coaching duties. Gloria McCullough and Mary Drussell 
were offered teaching contracts with duties in extra­
curricular activities added to the ones they al­
ready were supervising. Both teachers objected 
to additional assignments and altered their con­
tracts so that they were similar to the ones they 
had the previous year. The school district re­
jected the "altered" contracts and when the teachers 
refused to sign the original contracts within 
fifteen days, the district sought replacements for 
7 8 
their positions. 
The plaintiffs claimed that they were pro­
tected by a continuing contract law that guaranteed 
them "a preferential right in curricular positions, 
before considering new applicants for the same 
positions." The court ruled that the protection 
of a preferential right was too far removed from the 
teaching function to extend to extra curricular ac­
tivities. It cautioned that the job offer regarding 
extra duties must be reasonable "so that the law 
77 
McCullough v. Cashmere School District 222 of 
Chelan County, 551 P. 2d 1046 (Wash. App. 1976). 
78Ibid., p.' 83-84 
44, 
does not become a sword of subterfuge in the hand 
of the district, defeating the intent of the legis­
lature to create job security." It elaborated on 
this by pointing out that a teacher's preparation 
and experience must be considered before an assign-
79 
ment is made. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals of the State of 
Washington declared that the school district met the re­
quirements of the preferential right when it offered 
to renew the plaintiff1s' teaching contracts for 
girls' physical education. McCullough received a 
supplement to supervise a girls' activities program 
and to coach track. The school board added inter-
scholastic track and basketball to her duties. 
Drussell received extra pay to coach girls' gym­
nastics, and coaching girls' basketball for grades 
80 
7, 8 and 9 was added to her new contract. 
The court concluded that the plaintiffs were 
assigned reasonable contracts and their failure 
to accept them constituted an abandonment of their 
right of employment. It therefore supported the 
earlier decision of the superior court in favor of 
Q A 
the school district. 
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In a somewhat similar case from Tennessee, 
82 
White v. Banks, Larry White taught social Studies, 
coached basketball and coached the cross-country 
team at Elizabethton High School. He received a 
supplement of $1,700 for his coaching duties. In 
Tennessee there is no certification for coaching, 
but all coaches must hold a teaching certificate. 
After five years as a teacher and coach, the school 
board relieved him of his coaching duties, but re­
tained him as a teacher in the high school. The 
i 
superintendent did not oppose the action. White 
taught the following year, but did not coach or 
receive a supplement for coaching. He went to 
court seeking reinstatement as coach and reim­
bursement of the $1,7 00 he lost in supplement 
money, claiming that the superintendent had not 
agreed with the decision to terminate his coaching. 
When the trial court dismissed his petition, he 
83 appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 
The court, White v. Banks, (Tenn. 1981), held 
that a teacher who coaches has two basic rights: 
"(1) His position as a teacher is protected by 
82 
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83 
Herb Appenzeller, Sports and the Law, p. 80. 
46. 
tenure, assuming that he has acquired tenure status, 
and, (2) his position as a coach is protected by 
whatever contract he has with the board to perform 
84 
coaching duties, but not by tenure. 
It concluded that the superintendent had agreed 
with the board's action in relieving him of his 
coaching duties, which was not a suspension or dis­
missal but equivalent to a transfer within the 
school system. It upheld the lower court's de-
8 5 
cision in favor of the school district. 
The following case, Smith v. Board of Education of 
Urbana School District No. 116 of Champaign County, Ill­
inois, ̂  raises some pertinent questions regarding coaches 
in dual positions who have tenure in teaching but not 
coaching positions. Two physical education teachers, 
one who also coached football for 26 years, the other 
who coached baseball for three years, were informed 
that they would be retained as physical education 
teachers but not as coaches. The United States Court 
of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in Smith v. Board of Edu­
cation of Urbana School District No. 116 of Champaign 
County, Illinois, (7th cir. 1983), upheld the 
84T, . , Ibid. 
85T, . , Ibid. 
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Smith v. Board of Education of Urbana School 
District No. 116 of Champaign County, Illinois, 708 
F. 2d 258 (7th Cir. 1983). 
47 
school board's decision and commented: 
The Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause does not uuarantee a football 
or baseball coach a job at a public 
hiqh school even if his teams win and 
his players idolize him. The ultimate 
decision v:ho is the best mar. to coach 
a hi 9!". school athletic team rests with 
state school officials, not with 
federal courts. 
The court added: 
At most, the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause guarantees a state ath­
letic coach the right to know why he is 
being dismissed and to convince school 
officials before tfcey dismiss him that 
they are making a mistake, that their 
reasons for dismissing nim. are either 
not supported by facts or less compelling 
than they think. 87 
This case raises some pertinent questions re­
garding coaches in dual positions who have tenure 
8 8 in the teaching positions but not in coaching. 
The separation of coaching-teaching duties sur-
8 9 
faces in Neal v. School District of York where Dale 
Neal, a teacher and basketball coach in York County, 
Nebraska had had a teaching employment contract with the 
school district of York for three school years prior 
to 1976-77. In March, 1976, the school district 
O7 
Ibid., p. 80-81 
88t, . -Ibid. 
89 
Neal v. School District of York, 205 Nebraska 
558, 288 N.W. 2d 75 (1980). 
48 
notified Neal that his new contract would be amended 
to separate the coaching assignment from the teaching 
contract or his coaching contract would be terminated. 
Two separate contracts were presented to Neal - one 
for teaching and one for basketball coaching. Neal 
signed the teaching contract but returned the coaching 
_ 90 
contract unsigned. 
The school board had inserted language in Neal's 
coaching contract that provided: 
"The continuing contractual provision in 
Nebraska School Law 79-1254 shall not 
apply and this provision is expressly 
waived. This one (1) year contract in 
no way establishes any future expecta­
tions for coaching by Dale Neal at York 
High School. In this regard, due process 
procedures and just cause shall not be 
required to terminate this contract prior 
to the filling of the head basketball 
coaching position for the 1977-78 school 
year." 
Nebraska School Law 79-1254 refers only to "admin­
istrator or teacher" and does not mention "coach." The 
law provided in essence that the original contract be­
tween a board of education and administrator or teacher 
remained in effect until amended or terminated for just 
92 
cause. 
90 
Herb Appenzeller and C. Thomas Ross, J.D., Sports 
and the Courts (V.2, No. 1, Winter 1981) p. 7. 
91 
Ibid. 
92 
Ibid. 
Neal filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Nebraska and obtained an 
injunction enjoining the school district from re­
quiring Neal to make an agreement for coaching 
duties in the precise words proposed by the school 
district. In August, 1976, the school district 
hired another person to be the basketball coach for 
93 
the 1976-77 school year. 
Neal then filed suit in the Nebraska state court 
claiming the school district was contractualy obli­
gated, under his prior contract of employment, to 
pay him the sum of $1,458.00 for his services as var­
sity head basketball coach for the 1976-77 school 
year. Neal contended that a contract to coach is 
subject to the requirements of Section 79-1254 and 
that the school district failed to comply with that 
94 
law. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that whether 
a particular teacher is entitled to the procedural 
safeguards of Section 79-1254 is a matter of state 
concern and that they would not be bound by a federal 
court's interpretation of a state question. 
_ 
Ibid. 
94 
Ibid. 
The court held that nothing in the statutory 
language of Section 79-1254 indicates that the 
Nebraska legislature intended the position of 
coach to be within the applicable statutory defin­
ition of teacher or administrator and thus entitled 
to protection. They found no reference to the word 
"coach" in the tenure statutes nor did the Nebraska 
statutes listing the duties of a teacher in the 
school system list coaching among those recognized. 
The school district argued that if coaches were en­
titled to the protection demanded by Neal then all 
extracurricular assignments would be included and 
such a construction would interfere with the right 
of school authorities to make reasonable assignments 
of a teacher's extracurricular duties. The court 
held that a limitation of that magnitude is a de-
95 
cision for the legislature. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court found no applicable 
case law in Nebraska and relied on decisions from 
the courts of Minnesota, Florida and South Dakota. 
95 
Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the statute 
did not apply in this case and upheld the judgment of 
96 
the lower court in favor of the school district. 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed a lower 
court's decision and upheld the school board's firing 
of two non-probationary teachers who also coached 
football. The lower court had reinstated one of the 
coaches with back pay and awarded the other coach 
$900. Testimony revealed that the coaches per­
formed their teaching duties in a satisfactory 
manner but the school board was less than satis­
fied with their coaching. During their five years 
of coaching, "the team won 15 games and lost 28; 
won 4 and lost 14 in their own class AA; won 11 and 
lost 14 against teams of lower classification." The 
principal, acting on the school board's orders, 
notified the coaches that they had one year to turn 
the football program around. The next year their 
record was 4 and 4 and they were retained. The fol­
lowing year their record was 3 wins and 7 losses and 
96 
Ibid. 
they were fired by the school board. The Supreme 
Court of Arkansas ho 1n that this war not "aroitrary 
capricious cr discriminating" action and supported 
the school board's reason.- for termination that 
inc1uded: 
"inability to field a competitive team, 
inability to recruit more team members, 
inability to tench fundamentals of 
blocking and tackling, inability to 
create good team morale, inability to 
t.?ach recognition of and reaction to 
various offensive and defensive schemes 
and losing games by very lopsided scores. 
One justice concurred and one dissented and their 
comments are noteworthy: 
Justice Hickman (concurring): 
"I concur because the appellants sought 
employment as coaches and were hired as 
coaches. They were only incidently 
teachers." 
Justice Hays (dissenting): * 
"I cannot agree that someone hired as a 
football coach and teacher can be ter­
minated on the has- is of the team's won-
loss record, even though hired primarily 
as a coach. Certainly the board can 
non-renew the contract of a coach for any 
reason it choose?, but if his status con­
tinues beyond probation then it is my 
view that under the Teacher Dismissal Act 
he can be discharged only for cause, and 
that is not determined by so variable a 
standard as the team's ability to win." 
Lamar School District No 39 v. Kinder, Ark. 19 82) 98 
* + ***•*****•»•**** + **•*•*•*•*•*** + ** 
97 
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53. 
The decision to fire a coach with teaching 
tenure presents a frustrating dilemma to school 
administrators. If the fired coach chooses to re­
main at the school to teach, school officials often 
lack a teaching position for the coach's replacement. 
As a result, they often are forced to hire a less 
qualified coach or resort to employing a part-time 
99 and often noncertified coach. 
In a day when sports programs are at an unprece­
dented high, the need for qualified coaches is greater 
than ever. With increased sport-related litiga­
tion, the pressure is on the administrator to pro­
vide qualified coaches. 
A questionnaire was sent to 50 states and the 
territory of Puerto Rico to determine the status 
of coaches with regard to tenure and due process. 
Eighty-Eight percent responded to the 1984-1985 
survey, and the results indicate the situation 
9 9 
Herb Appenzeller, Sports and the Law, p. 81. 
that confronts the typical coach. A summary of the 
survey is as follows: 
1. Coaches can be granted tenure 
Yes 8 No 35 
(Two responded that it varies with 
the school district.) 
2. If given tenure, 1 to 5 years must be 
served on a probationary status. 
3. Coaches who give up coaching for teaching 
only can keep their teaching position. 
Yes 3_5 No 
(Several responded that it depends on 
the contract.) 
4. Coaches can be given formal hearings 
when relieved of their coaching duties. 
Yes 13 No 22 
(Several responded that it depends on 
school district, if requested, or if the 
individual had tenure as a teacher.)101 
To meet the problem of the divisible teacher-
coaching contract, many school districts require 
the individual to sign an indivisible contract. 
Loss of either position results in a loss of both 
positions .102 
101 
Ibid. 
1 0 2  t k  *  Ibid. 
5 5  •  
An Oregon case, George v. School District No. 8R 
103 
of Umatilla County, illustrates the court's atti­
tude when a school board revoked a coach's indivisible contract 
in a community that had little patience or tolerance for 
losing seasons and even less for losing coaches. 
After two dismal seasons, in which only two vic­
tories were recorded, the coach was informed that 
he could stay on and teach mathematics, but could 
no longer coach the football team. He accepted the 
decision until he learned that his salary would be 
cut by $2,000. He contended that his contract 
called for a salary of $9,300. The school board 
was just as adamant in its determination not to 
pay someone to do nothing. It ignored his protest 
and hired another person to replace him in the 
104 
classroom and on the football field. 
103 
George v. School District No. 8R of Umatilla 
County, 490 P. 2d 1009 (Ore. App. 1971). 
104Ibid., p. 81-82 
t 
The plaintiff was out of a job except for 
occasional days when he could substitute teach. 
In George v. School District No. 8R of Umatilla 
County, (Ore. App. 1971), he sued the school 
board for damages, and the Oregon court held 
that while the school board could replace him 
as coach it could not reduce his salary once it 
had contracted to pay him another amount. It 
awarded George $7,300 which represented his loss 
of wages from the time he was released to the 
. 105 
present. 
When coaches are fired or transferred to 
other positions, they frequently seek judicial 
relief by complaining that their constitutional 
rights have been violated. Coaches most often 
charge school officials with violation of their 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 
A common allegation is the contention that 
school officials failed to provide due process 
procedures guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 
105 
Ibid. 
57 
Munger v. Jesup Community School District**^ illus­
trates the role a community can play in coaching issues. 
A disgruntled group of booster club patrons met with 
the high school principal and demanded that he fire 
Larry Munger, the wrestling coach for allegedly failing 
to motivate his athletes. Munger was an assistant 
football coach and taught social studies. No one 
complained about his performance in these areas. 
The principal, who was Munger1s good friend, told 
him that "you or Underwood (the superintendent) or 
I will have to go." Munger resigned as wrestling 
coach and planned to continue teaching and assisting 
in football. The school board, however, refused 
to allow Munger to choose his preference since he 
had signed an indivisible contract to teach and 
coach. The board fired him and Munger appealed to 
an adjudicator. The adjudicator ruled for Munger 
and the board appealed to the District Court which 
reversed the adjudicator's decision. Munger then 
107 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa. 
3. 0 6 
Munger v. Jesup Community School District, 325 
N. W. 2d 377 (la. 1982) . 
107 
Herb Appenzeller and C. Thomas Ross, J. D., 
Sports and the Courts (V. 4, No. 2, Spring 1983) pp. 5-6. 
58 
The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with the board's 
ruling that Munger had an indivisible contract and 
could not resign from one duty and keep another. It 
noted that he must give up all the services specified 
in his agreement. It pointed out, however, that its 
task was to determine if the board's action was sup­
ported by "a preponderance of competent evidence 
The court surmised that the athletes and parents 
and booster club member^ never appeared in person to 
testify against the coach, that their charges were 
trivial and "couched in generalities" and that the 
same booster club had a history of firing coaches at 
the school. The Supreme Court heard favorable testi­
mony regarding the coach and concluded that the board 
* 
lacked evidence to support its decision to fire the 
coach. It reversed the lower court's judgment and 
reinstated Munger to his former teaching and coaching 
109 
position. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
59, 
While some cases deal with indivisible con­
tracts or new extracurricular duties, a case from 
Sports and the Law concerns the relationship between 
coaching duties and tenure rights. In the case of 
110 
Hood v. Alabama State Tenure Commission, David Hood 
had been employed as a teacher and coach for 10 years 
when he notified the school superintendent that he 
wanted to remain at the high school as a teacher but 
that he did not plan to coach. The school board 
hired a new teacher to coach and teach physical ed­
ucation for the remainder of the year. At the end 
of the year, Hood was informed that the school could 
not afford two teachers to do the job of one teacher 
and that he was being transferred to an elementary 
school position. He discovered that the job was to 
teach physical education in grades one through eight. 
Hood contended -that he was only certified to teach 
111 physical education at the secondary level. 
The school superintendent pointed out that it 
would be unsatisfactory to put the new coach in a 
1 1 0  
Hood v. Alabama State Tenure Commission, 418 
So. 2d 131 (Ala. 1982). 
Ill 
Idem, Sports and the Law, p. 80. 
60 . 
school other than the one he would be coaching 
112 
and directed Hood to accept the transfer. 
Hood took his case before the school board 
and the Alabama Tenure Commission, and both ruled 
against him. He then appealed to the Alabama 
Court of Appeals. The court supported the school 
superintendent and declared that the Tenure Act 
did not specify that a board of education had 
to give preference to a tenured teacher over a 
non-tenured one in transfer decisions. It upheld 
the previous judgment in favor of the school 
113 
superintendent. 
Another case, Hawkins v. Tyler County Board of 
114 
Education, deals with the separation of teaching 
and coaching duties. Lorraine Hawkins, a tenured 
physical education teacher and head coach for girls' 
volleyball and basketball refused her principal's 
request to add coaching girls' track to her duties. 
The following year, however, she was named the 
track coach. She accepted and was compensated for the 
extra duties. The next year she wrote to her principal 
and asked to be relieved of her coaching responsibilities 
for basketball and track but agreed to coach volleyball. 
Her principal immediately recommended to the school 
board that she be placed on the transfer list. Hawkins 
1 1 2  
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
114 
State ex. rel. Hawkins v. Tyler County Board 
of Education, 275 S.E. 2d 908 (W. Va. 1981) . 
61, 
thereby agreed to coach all three girls' sports if 
she could have an assistant coach to help her. When 
her request was denied, she sought relief in the 
Circuit Court and then appealed to the Supreme Court 
115 
of Appeals of West Virginia. 
Hawkins contended that there was a statute that 
prohibited a person from being a head coach in more 
than two sports. She argued that she was transferred 
because she refused to violate the statute. The Court 
noted that the superintendent had the authority to 
transfer teachers as long as the action was not arbi­
trary or capricious. It observed, however, that the 
power to transfer is not unlimited; it must not over­
load teachers with extra duties that hinder their 
teaching. In this case, Hawkins taught six hours a 
day and was sponsor of the junior class in addition to 
year-long coaching duties. In addition, the court did 
not feel that the school board could rely on an unoffi­
cial policy to support its action but needed to formu­
late a policy regarding qualifications for performing 
extracurricular activities and apply it uniformly 
Herb Appenzeller and C. Thomas Ross, J. D., 
Sports and the Courts (V. 4, No. 2 Spring 1983) p. 8. 
62, 
throughout the county. The court declared that 
such a policy should include written contracts, des­
cription of duties and amount of compensation to be 
paid. The court stated that: 
"The board may place teachers under 
separate contract to perform extra­
curricular duties such as coaching for 
a specified period of time without 
making such performances a condition 
of continuing employment and may take 
action with respect to teachers who 
fail or refuse to perform their con­
tractual obligations . 11 ^ ̂  ̂  
The court concluded that the board did not act in 
an arbitrary manner toward Lorraine Hawkins by trans­
ferring her when she refused to coach three sports 
without an assistant to help her. It reversed the 
lower court's decision and remanded it to the trial 
117 
court for further consideration. 
The question of alleged racial discrimination 
based on racial bias has been taken to court on 
many occasions. The following case involving racial 
discrimination illustrates the complexity of these 
cases as they relate to teacher/coaches. 
1 1 6  
Ibid., p. 9. 
117 
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Carroll High School had won only seven games in 
three years, fan support was down, the coach resigned, 
and the school board was considering dropping football 
because of a lack of revenue. The school board de­
cided to hire an experienced coach with an outstanding 
record in several high schools in Alabama to attempt 
to build a strong football program. The board did 
not want to lock the new coach in by retaining the 
entire staff of four assistant coaches, so it voted 
118 
not to renew the contract of two assistants. 
Anthony Lee, a black, non-tenured coach who was 
one of the two assistants dropped, sued the school 
board, alleging racial discrimination for terminating 
his contract. In Alabama a non-tenured teacher may be 
released for "any reason or no reason." The exception 
to such a broad statement occurs when the nonrenewal 
119 
is based on race. 
The court, in Lee v. Ozark City Board of Edu-
120 
cation found that the new coach hired two assis­
tants, one black, the other white to replace the 
black and white coaches who were released. It did 
not find evidence of racial discrimination and thereby 
affirmed the decision of the lower court in favor of 
the school board. 
118-  .  ,  
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
120 
Lee v. Ozark City Board of Education, 517 F. 
Supp. 686 (M.D. Ala. 1981). 
Race enters a further case, Pegues v. More-
121  
house Parish School Board. Johnnie Pegues is 
a black coach and a tenured teacher in the Morehouse 
Parish Louisiana school system. He was initially 
hired in 1965 as the head football coach at the then 
all-black school. When the school system was inte­
grated by court order in 1969, Pegues was assigned 
as an assistant football coach at a formerly all-
white high school which was coached by a white man. 
A new head football coach was hired at the school in 
1972 and another in 1973*, both of whom were white. 
Pegues was never offered the job of head football 
coach but continued as an assistant coach until the 
1977-78 school year, at which time he was named head 
track coach. On March 3, 1978, Pegues instituted a 
suit under the Civil Rights Act asking to be named 
12 2 head football coach and for back pay. 
The trial court granted Summary Judgment for the 
school board on two grounds, both having to do with 
1 the passage of time. J 
121  
Pegues v. Morehouse Parish School Board, 632 
1279 (5th Cir. 1980) 
122 
Herb Appenzeller and C. Thomas Ross, J.D., 
Sports and the Court V. 2, No. 4 Fall 1981)pp. 6-7. 
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Pegues appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals but it upheld the district court on the 
first claim under the Civil Rights Act since the 
statute of limitations had expired. In this parti­
cular case, there was a one-year limitation period 
set by Louisiana state law. The court noted that 
Pegues filed his complaint nine years after his 
initial demotion, eight years after he was first 
passed over for promotion, and approximately five 
years after the last alleged discriminatory turn­
over of the head football coaching position. The 
124 
appellate court held that the action was untimely. 
However, Pegues had a second claim under the 
case of Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate 
School District, (5th Cir. 1970). The Singleton 
case was decided on equitable grounds and, in essence, 
stated that if there was to be a reduction in the 
number of school employees which would result in 
dismissal or demotion of any staff members, the 
school system must select the staff person. To be 
dismissed or demoted on the basis of objective and 
reasonable non-discriminatory standards from among 
124 
Ibid. 
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all the staff members of the school district. In 
addition, no staff vacancies may be filled through 
recruitment of a person of a race, color or national 
origin, different from that of the individual dis­
missed or demoted until each displaced staff member 
who is qualified has had an opportunity to fill the 
125 vacancy and has failed to accept an offer to do so. 
The appellate court agreed that Pegues had, in 
fact, been "demoted" by virtue of the consolidation 
of the school system and was entitled to protection 
under the Singleton doctrine. The trial court had 
held Pegues' claim to be barred by the mere "passage 
of time." On this point, the appellate court reversed 
and remanded the case for a hearing. The appellate 
court reasoned that Pegues was entitled to special 
treatment unless and until he had failed to accept 
an offer to fill a vacancy. The court found that he 
had not been offered the job and that he was entitled 
to the "right of first refusal." The appellate court 
sent the case back for a determination of whether Pegues' 
conduct was inequitable because he had not filed the 
action sooner. Pegues v. Morehouse Parish School Board, 
(5th Cir. 1980). 126 
125 
Ibid. 
126 
Ibid. 
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In Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District 
127 
No. 1 sex discrimination, not racial discrimination, 
played a part in the case of Mary Shenefield who 
applied for a teaching position in Wyoming. The 
principal hired a man who could teach physical edu­
cation and coach. Shenefield submitted her case to 
the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission (hereafter 
referred to as Commission), and it agreed that dis­
crimination based on sex had taken place. The Dis­
trict Court of Sheridan County reversed the Commis­
sion's decision and the teacher appealed to the 
128 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
During the trial several factors that affected 
the school's decision were revealed. The principal 
testified that the plaintiff changed jobs frequently 
because she followed her husband wherever he took 
a new position. He described her as a "pushy, de­
manding type of person" who could not coach inter-
scholastic activities or intramurals. In addition 
127 
Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District 
No. 1, 544 P. 2d 870 (Wyo. 1976)-. 
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Herb Appenzeller, Physical Education and the 
Law, (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 
1981) pp. 75-76. 
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she would have required a substantially higher salary 
than the teacher they hired because of her degree and 
years of experience. The principal said that the 
teacher he hired had worked in the school system as a 
student teacher and was the type of person who could 
get along with the faculty. The school could hire 
129 
him for $2,600 less per year than the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming referred to pre­
vious cases that considered similar litigation and 
upheld the principle that the courts will not inter­
fere with the judgment of a school board in the 
employment or re-employment of a teacher "for any 
reason whatever or for no reason at all." The Wy­
oming court then reasoned that a school board does 
not give up its freedom to choose the teacher it 
wants just because it advertises for a teacher. It 
then favored the school board's decision to hire 
the male teacher by indicating that: 
1 2 9  
Ibid. 
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If it turns out that for reasons of 
economy, one applicant can fulfill the 
needs of the district at a cost sub­
stantially less than another applicant, 
even though the rejected applicant may 
on paper possess the greater qualifi­
cations, a selection of the less expen­
sive teacher cannot be said by any board 
or court to have been the result of dis­
crimination on the basis of sex. ̂  
It then concluded that a school board has the dis­
cretion of hiring a teacher who is able to perform addi­
tional duties such as coaching in the school's program. 
A school board must be able to select a teacher who is 
personally attractive to it without the threat of dis-
131 
crimination leveled against it. 
In another case, Burkey v. Marshall County Board 
132 
of Education, Linda Burkey graduated from college in 
197 0 after participating on four different school ath­
letic teams. In 1976 she received a Master's Degree 
in physical education. From July 1, 197 0, she had been 
employed as a teacher by the Marshall County Board of 
Education and had achieved tenure as a teacher after 
133 
completing a three-year probationary period. 
130 
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From 1971 to 1976, she coached girls' basketball 
at Moundsville Junior High School. In 1976, she was 
transferred to an elementary school and was not re­
appointed as a coach. Coaching appointments were 
made on a one-school year basis and no teacher employed 
134 
by the board achieved tenure as a coach. 
Burkey was primarily responsible for forming inter-
scholastic girls' basketball in Marshall County, West 
Virginia, and during the period of four school years, 
her teams won 31 games, lost 4 and forfeited one game. 
135 
In 1975, her team won the county championship. 
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit on April 6, 
1978, Burkey had spent five years attempting to achieve 
equality for women as coaches and participants in 
Marshall County, West Virginia. It was proven that 
during the early and mid-7O's, the county paid women 
at a salary level one-half that of male coaches of com­
parable or identical programs. Further, there were 
written "Governing Policies of Marshall County Junior 
High Athletic Programs" which clearly discriminated 
against female faculty members, both in terms of pay 
and opportunities to coach teams of the opposite sex 
as well as restrictions on numbers of games that could be 
134 
Ibid. 
135 
Ibid. 
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played and how the coaches must operate. 
As a part of her efforts, Burkey had totally 
exhausted her administrative remedies by filing com­
plaints with the school system, through administrative 
agencies of the state and federal government, including 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Depart­
ment of Health Education and Welfare, and the West 
137 
Virginia Human Rights Commission. 
Burkey1s primary claim was that she was discrim­
inated against on the basis of her sex, both in terms 
of payment and work opportunities, and that her transfer 
to a non-coaching position at another school was a re-
13 8 
taliation for her efforts to achieve equality. 
The lawsuit was filed in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia and 
after a trial, the district court agreed with Burkey 
and ruled in her favor. The court found that the board 
had an unwritten policy that female teachers could not 
coach boys' sports, that female teachers were at a 
salary level one-half that of male coaches, that Burkey 
was qualified to coach basketball and track for both 
girls and boys and in fact had qualifications equal or 
136Ibxa. 
137Ibid. 
138
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72 
superior to most of the males who coached in Marshall 
139 
County, West Virginia. 
The court found that the board's defenses, in­
cluding "economy measures" and "personality conflicts" 
were merely pretextual and that the board indeed had 
retaliated against her when they transferred her. The 
court held that these various activities constituted 
illegal discrimination against Burkey on the basis of 
sex, operated to deny her rights and were an unlawful 
employment practice prohibited under Title VII. The 
Court awarded her back pay and ordered the board to 
offer her the next available vacant physical education 
teaching position and to offer her the head coach's 
position for girls' basketball at any school in the 
County. The court further permitted Burkey to file 
a motion to recover attorneys' fees, costs and ex­
penses. Burkey v. Marshall County Board of Education, 
140 
(N. D. W. Va. 1981). 
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In Kneeland v. Bloom Tp. High School District 
141 No. 206, Alexis Kneeland sued the Bloom Township High 
School, its principal, the superintendent of the 
school district, and the individual members of the 
school district's board of education. She alleged 
violation of Title IX, claiming sex discrimination 
when she was dismissed from her position as Women's 
142 
Sports Coordinator at Bloom High School. 
In dismissing the plaintiff's action, the court 
noted that Title IX prohibited sex discrimination in 
connection with federally funded education programs 
but held that Title IX did not prohibit employment -
related sex discrimination in federally funded edu-
143 
cation programs. 
The court noted that three circuit courts of 
appeals (the first, sixth and eighth circuits) had 
reached the conclusion that Congress did not intend 
Title IX to generally embrace employment-related 
141 
Kneeland v. Bloom Tp. High School District 
No. 206, 484 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. 111.). 
142 
Idem, Sports and the Courts, (V. 2, No. 3 
Summer 1981) p. 9. 
1 4 3 , . ,  
Ibid. 
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discrimination based on sex except in the very 
narrow area where an employee was doing work which 
144 was specially funded by the federal government. 
The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim since 
Title IX did not apply to the allegations of her 
145 
lawsuit. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
Another case involves coaches in the issue of 
corporal punishment. In Bowman v. Pulaski County 
146 
Special School District, Bob Bowman was an assis­
tant football coach and science teacher at Jackson­
ville Junior High School Northside in Jacksonville, 
Arkansas. James Mackey was a science teacher 
and assistant coach in both football and bas­
ketball. Each had an excellent record as a 
teacher and coach. On April 29, 1982 head football 
144T, Ibid. 
Ibid. 
146 
Bowman v. Pulaski County Special School Dis­
trict, 723 F. 2d 640 (8th Cir. 1983). 
I  
coach Jimmy Walker disciplined five students in 
his office by striking them across the buttocks 
and thighs with a paddle. The single lick given 
to each student was excessive as it raised welts 
147 and bruises on the backs of the student's thighs. 
The Pulaski County Special School District 
permitted corporal punishment, but regulated the 
practice. One of the regulations required a 
second faculty member to witness the actual pun­
ishment, to listen as tlje student was informed of 
the reason for the disciplinary action and then 
148 
fill out and sign a form reporting the incident. 
On the day of the incident, Bowman and Mackey 
were in the office when the punishment started, 
though Mackey left the room about the time the 
first lick was struck. Coach Walker did not re­
quest either of them to act as a witness though 
he did explain to the students the reason for the 
punishment. 
Bowman and Mackey offered assistance to the 
students, discussed the punishment with parents, 
- __ __ 
Idem, Sports and the Law, p.90. 
148 
Ibid. 
149 
Ibid. 
made public statements about the unwarranted 
severity of the licks and expressed opinions 
150 
on how Walker should be disciplined. 
The parents of the students were upset over 
the incident and made Coach Walker's method of 
discipline on this and other occasions a matter 
of public debate. The incident drew a considerable 
amount of press coverage, caused some turmoil in 
the community and was blamed for dividing a 
previously harmonious faculty and student body. 
Coach Walker, after the effects of the punishment 
were known, asked Bowman to complete and sign a 
151 
witness form. Bowman refused to sign. 
Coach Walker was briefly suspended, and his 
authority to administer corporal punishment was 
curtailed. He also issued a public apology. 
Bowman and Mackey were involuntarily transferred 
to Scott Middle School, a recently reopened 
*  -1 - 4 -  1 5 2  facility. 
150 
Ibid. 
151 
Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
152 
Ibid. 
After exhausting available administrative 
remedies, Bowman and Mackey filed a lawsuit 
alleging violation of their civil rights. The 
trial court heard the case and rescinded the invol­
untary transfer, ordered the parties to make a good 
faith attempt to resolve the dispute among the 
coaching staff and stated that if such efforts were 
unavailing, then a transfer of Bowman and Mackey to 
a better or comparable school would be permitted. 
Thereafter, Coach Walker remained adamant in his 
153 
refusal to work with either party. 
Mackey was transferred to another school where 
he was assigned to coach football and basketball 
and asked to teach social studies rather than 
science. His total round-trip mileage to and from 
work increased from less than one mile to approx­
imately 68 miles. Bowman was transferred to 
another school where he assumed the position of 
head coach for tenth grade football and was re­
quired to teach American history rather than 
science. His driving distance increased to approx­
imately 100 miles to and from work, an increase over 
154 
his earlier minimal amount of travel time. 
153 XK-* Ibid. 
154 Tk^ Ibid. 
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Bowman and Mackey remained dissatisfied with 
their new positions and petitioned the district 
court for further relief. The district court 
denied the motion for further relief, and Bowman 
and Mackey appealed. As a part of the trial court 
action, the district court had awarded Bowman's 
and Mackey's attorneys $11,268.50 in attorneys' 
- 155 
fees. 
On appeal, in Bowman v. Pulaski Special School 
District, (8th Cir. 1983), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial 
court's decision and ordered that Bowman and Mackey 
be restored to the positions they held at Jacksonville 
Junior High School Northside. The Eighth Circuit also 
•1 C /T 
affirmed the award of $11,268.50 in attorneys' fees. 
The Eighth Circuit noted that a three-step an­
alysis must be undertaken in first amendment cases. 
The court must determine; (1) whether the plaintiff 
has carried the burden of proving that he engaged in 
protective activity; (2) whether the protected activ­
ity was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
actions taken against the plaintiff; and (3) whether 
the defendant has defeated the plaintiff's claim by 
demonstrating that the same action would have been 
155 
Ibid. 
156 
Ibid. 
1  ̂ 7  taken in the absence of the protected activity. 
In ruling in favor of Bowman and Mackey the 
court noted that this incident had generated sub­
stantial public interest, that the time, manner 
and place of their speech was reasonable in that 
it followed the incident closely, was on school 
property and was restrained and moderate and that 
the speech arose in the context of discipline of 
students. The court stated: 
While we recognize and respect the 
importance of harmony and cohesion 
in any educational institution, we 
must conclude that the appellant's 
speech was protected by the First 
Amendment-. In our mind the pub­
lic's need to know whether child­
ren are being mistreated in school 
outweighs the other legitimate 
concerns of the government.1^® 
The court pointed out that involuntary trans­
fers could be as effective as discharges in chilling 
159 
the exercise of first amendment rights. 
157 
Ibid. 
158 
Ibid. , p. 91-92. 
159 
Ibid. 
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160 
Bradshaw v. Board of Education of Taylor County 
raises an interesting question with respect to the status 
of a teacher/coach. Carter B. Bradshaw was a classroom 
teacher and head football coach at Taylor High School 
for four years. In February, 1978, he was notified 
that he would no longer be the football coach after 
the end of the current school year. In April, 1978, 
he was notified by letter that his salary would be 
reduced because of his dismissal as head football 
coach. Bradshaw filed suit against the board of 
education and superintendent, alleging his dismissal 
as head football coach was improper because the 
school board had failed to follow Kentucky law con­
cerning demotion of administrators and that he had 
not been given proper notice concerning his salary 
reduction. He alleged' he was an administrator be­
cause he held "a position in which he evaluates or 
supervises board employees," meaning his assistant 
161 
coaches. 
The trial court ruled against Bradshaw and he 
appealed. The Kentucky court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that Bradshaw was not included within the 
160 
Bradshaw v. Board of Education of Taylor County, 
607 S.W. 2d 427 (Ky. App. 1980). 
"^•'"Idem, Sports and the Courts, (V.2, No. 4 
Fall 1981) p. 7-8. 
81. 
definition of administrator. The lav/ defining 
"administrator" required that the employee devote 
"the majority of his employed time to service...in 
162 which he evaluates or supervises board employees... 
Since the position of coach was not specifically 
included in the list of administrative positions and 
since Bradshaw did not devote a majority of his em­
ployed time to supervising his assistant coaches, the 
court concluded he was not an administrator. The 
court also held that he had received proper notice of 
his reduction in salary, since the only legal require­
ment for notice was that it be in writing, furnished 
to the teacher not later than May 15 of each year and 
set forth the reasons for such reduction. Bradshaw v. 
Board of Education of Taylor Gntv , (Ky. App. 1980) ®^ 
1 6 ^  
Bradshaw v. Board of Education of Taylor County, 
607 S.W. 2d 427 (Ky. App. 1980). 
82, 
Assignments, Non-Classroom 
The question of whether or not a teacher may 
legally refuse to perform extra duties depends on 
the reasonablenesss of the requirement. 
For determining the reasonableness of extra 
duty assignments the following guide rules should be 
considered: 
Guide Rules 
1. A teacher may be required to take over 
a study hall. 
2. A teacher may be required to supervise 
student organizations in the area of 
his or her teaching field. 
3. English and social science teachers may 
be requested to coach or supervise plays. 
4. Physical education teachers may be expected 
to coach intramurals. 
5. Teachers may be required to supervise 
field trips. 
Even in considering the above suggested guide rules, 
legal issues may still arise. 
1. Is an excessive number of hours involved 
in the assignments? 
2. Are the students benefited? 
83 
3. Are the extra assignments distributed 
evenly among the teachers, i.e., is 
DISCRIMINATION involved? 
4. Are the assignments professional in 
nature? 
5. Do the assignments relate to the teacher's 
164 
field of CERTIFICATION and interests? 
A few cases may help to point out how the courts 
look at challenges to schools' extra assignments based 
upon the above questions. For example, question 4 asks 
if the assignment is professional in nature. This is 
important because teachers may not be required to per­
form menial tasks, such as janitorial services or 
police (traffic) service. Following this reasoning, 
one court held that a teacher could not be forced to 
collect tickets at a football game because collecting 
tickets was a task that any adult could perform and 
was not professional in nature. The court added 
that the administration's requirement that teachers 
collect tickets was not intended to benefit the 
students. Rather, the court found that the admin-
164 
Richard D. Gatti and Daniel J. Gatti, New 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of School Law (West Nyack, 
New York: Parker Publishing Company, 1983) pp.53-54. 
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istration was motivated primarily by a desire to cut-
165 
expenses. 
It is important to remember, however, that class­
room duties are not the only duties a teacher may be 
required to perform. The following cases show that 
extracurricular assignments will be upheld by the 
courts when they are "fair and reasonable and related 
1 6 6  
to school programs." 
In a 197 5 case, a teacher challenged the validity 
of a school policy that required teachers to attend or 
supervise certain nonacademic school activities. These 
activities, which included football and basketball 
games, pep rallies and music programs, were held on 
weekday evenings and Saturdays. The court found that 
such assignments were reasonably related to the 
teachers' teaching duties. Therefore, even though 
the teachers' CONTRACT did not mention such extra­
curricular assignments, the teachers could be re­
quired to attend and supervise such activities. 
165 
Ibid. 
166 
Ibid. 
Moreover, the court held that teachers could be 
compensated at a lower than contract rate of pay 
for these activities. 
Another case involved a school board that 
sought to fill a coaching position for a girls' 
high school basketball team. The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held in this case that the teacher 
who turned down the position, although she was 
168 
well qualified, could be terminated. 
Similarly, a Washington state court decided 
that teachers may be required to assume reasonable 
extracurricular duties as a condition precedent to 
their reemployment as long as the extracurricular 
duties are within the educational and professional 
169 
preparation and experience of the teacher. 
The court reasoned in this case that programs 
aimed at expanding women's physical education were 
reasonably related to a legitimate educational 
purpose. Therefore, teachers may be required to 
170 
participate in these programs. 
167 
Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
1 6 8  
Ibid. 
169 
Ibid. 
170 
Ibid. 
Other courts have decided that refusing to per­
form extracurricular duties constitutes a strike. 
In so doing, a New Jersey court reasoned that: 
"Extracurricular activities are a fundamental part of 
a child's education, making the supervision of such 
activities an integral part of a teacher's duty to-
171 
ward his or her students." 
Guide Rule 
It is advisable to consult state statutes 
because they often dictate the scope and 
nature of the allowable extracurricular 
duties. Such statutes may also indicate 
whether compensation will be made for the 
172 
performance of these duties. 
171 
Ibid. 
17 
^Ibid. 
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EMPLOYMENT AND JOB SECURITY 
Contracts 
Simply stated, a contract is an agreement be­
tween two or more parties (not merely a unilateral 
expectation) which is enforceable by law. Generally, 
employees in public school systems look to the writ­
ten document (sometimes taking the form of a simple 
salary letter) they receive from their school board, 
sign, and return by a specified date as the complete 
embodiment of their employment contract with the 
school board. Given the complexities of contract 
law, this may or may not be so. In reality, such a 
determination can be made only after careful exam­
ination of appropriate state law, school board 
policies, and the specific document inself. Whether 
or not an agreement (oral or written) has ripened 
into an enforceable contract is a question to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. As a general 
rule, however, once a contract exists, it is en­
forceable by either party and it shall not be 
significantly modified or breached unilaterally by 
173 
either party. 
173 
H. C. Hudgins, Jr. and Richard S. Vacca, 
Law and Education; Contemporary Issues and Court 
Decisions (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie 
Company, 1985) p 164. 
88 
Generally, a valid contract is enforceable 
whether made orally or in writing. Early in their 
studies, law students encounter the statute of frauds. 
Simply stated the statute of frauds requires that cer­
tain types of contracts must be in writing. The in­
tent of such statues where they exist (and one must 
look to the appropriate state code to discover such 
17 4 
provisions) is to prevent fraudulent claims. 
Teachers' Tenure as Job Security 
To protect themselves from excessive exercises of 
school board authority and to establish job security, 
teachers have over the years relied on the existence 
of tenure statutes. Tenure (or continuing contract as 
it is called in some states) is conferred by state law 
and can be changed or repealed by legislative enactment 
only. Thus, to discover how tenure status and its 
specific guarantees are attained, one must examine the 
specific statutes of a given state. Under Texas law, 
for example, the decision is that of the local school 
board as to whether or not to adopt continuing contract 
17 5 provisions or to offer exployees fixed term contracts. 
174 
Ibid., p. 165. 
175 
Ibid., p. 171. 
In Law and Education; Contempory Issues and 
Court Decisions, Hudgins and Vacca indicate 
that tenure in public education systems is not a 
guarantee of permanent employment. Tenure laws were 
meant in their inception and are meant now "to give 
job security to unified employees who meet the 
necessary qualifications and who satisfactorily 
have served the probationary period..." Thompson 
v. Modesto City High School, (Cal. 1977). As such, 
tenure restricts the legal authority of a local 
school board to terminate the employment of an em­
ployee (who has been awarded tenure) absent a showing 
of cause... Simmons v. Drew, (7th Cir. 1983). Once 
attained, therefore, tenure exists to protect com­
petent teachers from unlawful, arbitrary, and 
capricious board actions and to provide orderly 
procedures (enumerated in state statutes) to be 
followed if and when cause for a teacher's dismissal 
is established. 
It must be remembered that tenure generally is 
obtained in a particular school system within a given 
state and may or may not be honored by another school 
system or other educational organization within that 
same state. Moreover, tenure accrues to types of 
176 
Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
positions in a system (e.g., teacher, principal, 
supervisor) and not to specific assignments and 
positions (e.g., first grade teacher at Hill Ele­
mentary School). In a previously mentioned case, 
Smith v. Board of Education (1983), the Seventh 
Circuit made it clear that under the statutes of 
Illinois two physical education teachers had 
177 tenure as teachers but not as coaches. 
Regarding assignments of teachers to extra­
curricular duties, courts have granted discretion 
to local boards of education. In a recent New 
Jersey case, Board of Education v. Asbury Park 
Education Association (N. J. 1976), it was held that 
a local board need show only that the extracurri­
cular assignments are reasonable, nondiscriminatory, 
are related to a teacher's interests and expertise, 
and do not require excessive hours. .And, a teacher 
17 8 need not be compensated for such assignments. 
Compensation for extra assignments was one 
issue in a recent case decided by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Western District of Louisiana. 
In this case, however, a female associate professor 
at a state university claimed that her heavier than 
177T, . , Ibid. 
178Ibid., p. 180. 
normal course load kept her from the opportunity 
to teach extra courses for pay - something which 
her male counterparts could do because of their 
normal course loads, Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 
L. S. U. (5th Cir. 1983). Claiming, among other 
things, a violation of the Equal Pay Act, the 
plaintiff alleged that her faculty position had 
actually replaced two full-time professors and, as 
a result, she had a'workload totalling eighteen to 
twenty-one hours per semester, while her male 
counterparts carried nine hours per semester. Thus, 
since her extra-heavy course load precluded her 
from working for extra pay as did male faculty, she 
had been placed in a position wherein she received 
17 9 
"less money for equal work." 
The United States District Court, Western Dis­
trict of Louisiana, dismissed her complaint and the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that de­
cision. In the court's opinion, "workload discrim­
ination per se is not actionable under the Equal Pay 
179 
Ibid., p. 180. 
180 
Ibid., pp. 180-181. 
SUMMARY 
The literature indicates that most teacher/coache 
have difficulty giving their best effort to both teach 
ing and coaching responsibilities. Because of the 
pressures brought on by coaching, exceptional perfor­
mance in both roles may not occur. Studies indicate 
that these pressures often cause many teacher/coaches 
to retreat into the coaching role. 
Coaching is really teaching. The most successful 
coaches are also very good teachers. Usually when 
teacher/coaches experience difficulties with employers 
over inadequate performance in one or both areas, a 
close examination will reveal a less than adequate per 
formance in one or both areas. Too many coaches ne­
glect one or the other and the price is usually job 
termination. 
This, of course, would appear to lead to more 
teacher/coaches suing school boards when their con­
tracts are terminated. This trend seems to have be­
gun in the mid to late sixties and has picked up 
momentum as we move to the late eighties. More and 
more cases involve some issue that is related to 
employment. 
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CHAPTER III 
MAJOR LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL ISSUES RELATED 
TO THE DISMISSAL OF A TEACHER/COACH FROM 
HIS COACHING POSITION ONLY 
Introduction 
With the completion of the Texas-Texas A & M 
football game recently, the 1986 college football 
season came to its end. When that game ended, with 
A & M winning 16-3, the Texas coach, Fred Akers, 
under fire all season, found himself relieved of 
his coaching position. Texas alumni were openly 
dissatisfied with his performance and had made sure 
he knew of their desire for a coaching change. 
Coach Akers, 48, was well aware of the attitude 
towards him. Before the season began, Akers said, 
"We're going to do the best we can with what we've 
got, and if that isn't good enough for'em, the 
_ _ _ _ with'em."1 
Despite winning nearly 75% of his games during 
9 years as Texas' head coach, he did not win enough 
of the games against A & M and Oklahoma, considered 
big games by the Texas alumni. In other words, he 
1 
Alexander Wolff, "The Eyes of Texas..., 
Sports Illustrated, December 8, 1986, p. 43. 
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did not win Texas-style or Texas-big. 
The Akers story is indicative of the situa­
tion all too often present at the collegiate level. 
However, this degree of occupational security, or 
more accurately, insecurity is also very evident 
at the secondary school level. Many coaches often 
become the victims of a community and school that 
get caught up in an atmosphere of sports mania. 
This mania can generate so much pressure to win 
that when the win-ethic is not met the coach has 
to go. 
The inherent challenge to the teacher/coach 
is maintaining a commitment to quality performance 
in both jobs. It is an ethical challenge — a 
challenge of conscience. It involves effectively 
dealing with the feelings of frustration and guilt 
that are generated as one job begins to consume 
2 
the other. 
By law, school boards are given the legal right 
to employ teachers of their choice by using various 
2 
James A Rog, "Teaching and Coaching the Ultimate 
Challenge," Journal of Physical Education Recreation 
and Dance, 55 (August, 1984):jM8. 
criteria such as ability and salary. Teachers 
are employed to perform particular duties and 
as long as these duties are within reason 
teachers may be assigned extracurricular duties. 
A teacher's contract to teach and coach may be 
divided if the board agrees, but if not, the 
teacher who prefers to do only one assignment is 
subject to dismissal. 
The Victims 
Although instructional positions are secure 
for those who have received tenure status as 
teachers, the "scapegoat" phenomenon has destroyed 
many coaches. Non-tenured teacher/coaches are gen­
erally also dismissed from teaching, Abell, even 
though their classroom performance may have been 
3 
exemplary. Within Indiana, for example, nearly 
25% of approximately 400 male basketball coaches 
left their positions due to retirement, promotion, 
or dismissal in each of the last three years. 
Approximately 20% were dismissed by school officials 
for failure to win or to meet other role expectations , 
Mannies, 1981. In one area encompassing 26 high 
3 
Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 321 
S.E. 2d 502 (1984). 
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schools, 54 men have coached basketball in the 
last six years — an average of two coaches per 
4 • 
school, Washburn, 1980. one school has hired 
and fired four coaches in the last five years. 
Within the same state, Washburn reports that over 
the past 25 years the average tenure of a varsity 
basketball coach at a school has been only three 
years. Coaches have often had little time to 
produce a winner.^ 
Influences of Professional 
Sports and Television 
Clearly, sports are very much big business, 
and corporate managers care not a whit for "edu­
cating" their followers into the traditional joys 
of sports.6 
Television is an especially harmful influence. Tele­
vision's shallow beam focuses mostly on a few thousand 
professional athletes. It is an unreasonable and 
unrealistic focus. Millions of kids are playing 
organized amateur sports; only a few men and women 
Templin and Washburn, "Winning Isn't Every­
thing. .. Unless You're the Coach," pp. 16-17. 
5Ibid. 
6Karl.Lindholm, "Coaching As Teaching: Seeking 
Balance," Phi Delta Kappan, 60 (January, 1979) :p.734. 
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are capable enough to play as a career. Yet these 
youngsters naturally draw the substance and style 
of their athletic aspirations from their favorite 
pro star as seen on television. The relationship be­
tween the young player and the pro star is increasingly 
unfortunate. The values and motivation in the pro 
game (or major college game) are hardly akin to 
the sportsmanship, fair play, and simple enjoy­
ment that we claim to place at the core of the 
scholastic athletic experience. Will not a young 
tennis player adopt Jimmy Conner's "half a peace 
7 
sign" as well as his two-handed backhand?" 
Coaches of young athletes, too, are affected 
by those pro and major college coaches who are cele­
brated in the media and who teams appear on tele­
vision. Many coaches of young athletes fail to realize 
the immense difference between their roles and those 
of big-time mentors. A high school football coach 
who aspires to be like the late Woody Hayes or a base­
ball coach who emulates Billy Martin is failing in his 
7 
Ibid. 
responsibilities to his youngsters. The big time 
game is a cutthroat world in which coaches are 
not evaluated on their treatment of players, their 
interest in teaching, or their humane approach. 
Winning —no, not even winning — coming in first 
is the only criterion of success. This kind of 
obsessiveness has no place in school sports, in 
which winning is a suitable goal but not an end in 
itself.® 
The corruption of the pro game is a discussion 
for another time. It is relevant here only in its 
potential for displaying models — inappropriate 
models — to kids and their coaches. The words of 
Vince Lombardi's son are worth considering: 
He [the senior Lombardi] has been 
a great influence on a lot of coaches, 
not just in the pros but on lower levels, 
down to pre-high school football coaches. 
And from what I've seen and heard, I'm 
not convinced that younger kids are pre­
pared for the strain that some well-
meaning coaches place on them. Maybe 
you can't overstress striving for excel­
lence, but I think you can over-empha­
size striving for victory. 
8 
Ibid. 
9 
Ibid., pp 735-736. 
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School teacher/coaches function within a very 
different environment and should have a very dif­
ferent purpose from the Vince Lombardis. To ful­
fill themselves as teachers, coaches must offset 
the powerful pro model, withstand unreasonable out­
side pressures, and understand that their players 
are not full-time athletes. They must reinforce 
on a daily basis the long-standing,' uncommercial 
rewards of sports. 
Coaches' Employment Issues/ 
Sports Litigation 
State and federal courts over the years have 
been reluctant to usurp the discretionary powers 
of local boards as they relate to personnel matters. 
As a result, local school boards have considerable 
freedom in matters that pertain to the employment, 
assignment, nonrenewal, suspension, transfer and 
dismissal of coaches. Courts basically require only 
that school boards exert reasonableness in dealing 
1 1  
with their personnel. 
The typical coach signs a divisible contract 
which requires the coach to teach and assume respon­
sibility to coach one or more sports. The coaching 
assignment is separate and apart from teaching and 
11 
Herb Appenzeller, Sports and Law, p. 98. 
can be terminated for little or no reason. If a 
coach acquires tenure for teaching, he may be 
able to keep the teaching position although the 
12 coaching assignment has been terminated. 
Some school districts throughout the nation 
favor indivisible contracts which mean that indiv­
iduals are hired on one contract to teach and 
coach. Termination of either duty leads to loss 
13 
of both positions. 
The courts favor coaches who can prove that 
school districts have discriminated against them 
on the basis of sex or race. When coaches can 
prove that their rights of due process or freedom 
of expression have been denied them, the courts 
consistently rule in their behalf. The recent 
cases of Knapp, McGee and Bowman(referred to in 
Chapter II) point out the attitude of the courts 
regarding violation of rights. The rulings in these 
cases favoring the coaches offer a warning to school 
officials that the rights of coaches must be upheld. 
Ibid. 
13.,., 
Ibid. 
101. 
It seems clear that employment issues involving 
coaches will continue to be a problem that will go 
to the courts for judicial redress in the years to 
come. If enough judicial decisions are resolved, 
guidelines for coaches and school officials may 
finally help school officials in their role as de­
cision makers.^ 
A 1984-85 survey of the 50 states, the District 
of Columbia, and the territory of Puerto Rico re­
vealed that only seven states grant coaches tenure 
for coaching while 22 states refuse them due process 
when they are fired from their coaching duties. A 
majority of the 88% of the states responding re­
ported that tenured teachers who are dismissed from 
coaching responsibilities can keep their teaching 
jobs. (See Tables I, II, III).16 
15 
Ibid. 
16 
Ibid. 
102. 
TABLE I 
STATES GRANTING TENURE 
FOR COACHING 
State Yes No 
Alabama X 
Alaska X (not mandatory 
but permissive) 
Arizona X 
Arkansas X no difference between 
coaches and teachers 
California X 
Colorado X 
Connecticut X 
Delaware X 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 
Georgia X 
Hawaii X 
Idaho X 
Illinois X 
Indiana X 
Iowa 
Kansas X 
Kentucky X 
Louisiana X 
Maine X 
Maryland X 
Massachusetts 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X 
Mississippi X 
Missouri X 
Montana X 
Nebraska Varies with local school districts 
Nevada X 
New Hampshire X 
New Jersey 
New Mexico X 
New York X 
North Carolina Both - either/or 
North Dakota 
Ohio X 
Oklahoma X 
Oregon X w/teaching pos. 
Pennsylvania X 
Puerto Rico X 
Rhode Island X 
South Carolina X 
South Dacota X 
Tennessee X 
Texas X 
Utah X 
Vermont X 
Virginia X 
Washington X 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming X 
TABLE II 
STATES REFUSING COACHES 
DUE PROCESS 
State YOB No 
Alabama If requested 
Alaska Not requested by state 
Arizona X 
Arkansas — --
California X (if also a teacher) 
Colorado X 
Connecticut Possibly 
Delaware Individual Basis 
Dist. of Columbia .. 
Florida — 
Georgia If requested 
Hawaii X 
Idaho X 
Illinois X 
Indiana X 
Iowa — 
Kansas X 
Kentucky Depends on local policy 
Louisiana X 
Maine X 
Maryland X 
Massachusetts — 
Michigan X 
Minnesota If requested 
Mississippi X (as teachers) 
Missouri NA 
Montana X 
Nebraska — .. 
Nevada X 
New Hampshire X 
New Jersey — --
New Mexico X 
New York Vary w/contracts 
North Carolina X 
North Dakota — _ _  
Ohio X 
Oklahoma X 
Oregon X 
Pennsylvania X 
Puerto Rico NA 
Rhode Island — 
South Carolina X 
South Dacota X 
Tennessee X 
Texas X 
Utah X 
Vermont If requested 
Virginia X 
Washington X 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin — 
Wyoming X 
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TABLE EH 
STATES ALLOWING COACHES TO GIVE UP COACHING 
AND STILL TEACH 
State Yes No 
Alabama X 
Alaska X 
Arizona X (unless tenured as teacher) 
Arkansas — .. 
California X 
Colorado X 
Connecticut X 
Delaware X 
Dist. of Columbia -- — 
Florida — --
Georgia X 
Hawaii X 
Idaho X 
Illinois X 
Indiana X 
Iowa — — 
Kansas X 
Kentucky X 
Louisiana X 
Maine X 
Maryland X 
Massachusetts ~ — 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X 
Mississippi -- — 
Missouri NA 
Montana X 
Nebraska " — 
Nevada X 
New Hampshire X 
New Jersey — — 
New Mexico X 
New York Vary w/contracts 
North Carolina X 
North Dakota .. — 
Ohio X 
Oklahoma Depends on contract 
Oregon Depends on contract 
Pennsylvania X 
Puerto Rico X 
Rhode Island X 
South Carolina X 
South Dacota X 
Tennessee X 
Texas X 
Utah X 
Vermont X 
Virginia X 
Washington X 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin .. — 
Wyoming X 
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A review of the literature in Chapter II re­
veals that when coaches lose their jobs, it is al­
most certain that an allegation will be made re­
garding a lack of due process. In that regard their 
cases are no different from that of many non-
coaching teachers who lose their jobs. Most of the 
time when due process is an issue, the protections 
and guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment are cited 
by the coach. 
Discrimination is another frequent area of liti­
gation. Coaches usually carry their cases to court 
when they believe that they have been the victim of 
racial or sexual discrimination. 
Typically, coaches are in an exceptional posi­
tion in today's society. They are highly visible and, 
probably more than most professionals, subjected to 
either excessive praise or criticism. For years they 
had little to fear from the courts since most people 
did not sue coaches, and coaches did not sue others. 
Times have changed and issues dealing with coaches' 
employment continually surface in the courts and 
appear to be one of the most frequent intersections 
106, 
of the law and sports. The majority of litigation 
involving coaches has to do with some aspect of 
employment. 
If our American society continues to be sports crazy, 
and currently there is very little to indicate any 
significant change, coaches most likely will re­
main under pressure from people who feel qualified 
to supervise the staffing and operation of high school 
sports programs. The typical practice of intervention 
into high school sports of parental, community, and 
administrative groups has allowed significant people 
to be in position to confront, berate, and eventually 
work for the dismissal of coaches not meeting parti­
cular expectations. 
Those persons in responsible positions who have 
control of the coach's future need to be more under­
standing with regard to key issues. Why hold the 
coach responsible to people with little or no back­
ground in the mechanics or understanding of coaching? 
Is it fair to criticize a coach for either playing 
or not playing a certain player or lineup? When a 
coach who has enjoyed success and has been a positive 
107., 
figure in a school for a number of years has a 
losing season, should he be dismissed? Atten­
tion must be given to these and other questions 
if coaches are to be treated fairly. 
Dismissals 
The United States Supreme Court has inter­
preted the broad language of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to mean that nearly all of the individual 
freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by 
the Bill of Rights are protected against improper 
17 
action by state or federal actions. 
The state has the responsibility of estab­
lishing and maintaining the public schools. Even 
though local school boards do the actual hiring, 
the state is the employer of public school teachers 
and administrators. The school board acts as an 
agent of the state, as do the school district em­
ployees when they are performing their governmental 
duties. As the Supreme Court has said, the state 
may not enact any laws or engage in any activities 
which are in violation of an individual's constitu­
tional rights. It follows, therefore, that local 
school boards and school officials are also pro-
17 
Richard D. Gatti and Daniel J. Gatti, New 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of School Law, (West Nyack, 
New York: Parker Publishing Company, 1983), p. 96. 
hibited from enacting any rules or regulations 
which substantially infringe on an individual's 
constitutional rights. This means that teachers 
and administrators have certain constitutional 
protections assuring them of such liberties as: 
.protection from arbitrary, capricious 
or discriminatory actions or dismissals 
on the part of the local board and 
due process. 18 
These protections are substantial. Never­
theless, it must be stressed that these rights 
are not absolute. Reasonable restrictions may 
be placed upon one's constitutional rights be­
cause the courts must weigh constitutional rights 
against the need for effective school management 
and operation. Therefore, certain restrictions -
may incidentially curtail the teacher's or admin­
istrator's constitutional rights. That is, they 
may do so if these restrictions are necessary to 
promote the efficient operation of the school. 
When that is the case, such restrictions will be 
upheld.1^ 
18Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
19 
Ibid. 
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Essentially, due process is a course of pro­
ceedings following established rules which protect 
and enforce the rights of individuals. The most 
important element of due process is fundamental 
fairness- Teacher/coaches have a right to due 
process of law. The due process rights of non-
tenured teacher/coaches may at times be different 
from those of tenured teachers. 
Tenured Teacher/Coaches 
Due process procedures are necessary to assure 
teacher/coaches that the reasons for their dismissal, trans­
fer, nonrenewal, or demotion do, in fact, exist and they 
are not based on rumors, false facts or reasons which 
are in violation of their constitutional rights. The 
chilling effect on substantive rights without such 
procedures is clear.^ 
Tenured teachers have a right to a statement of 
the reasons for the proposed action and a fair 
hearing. A tenured teacher cannot be lawfully dis-
21 missed unless both of these requirements are met. 
20 
Ibid., p. 153. 
21Ibid., p. 154. 
Non-Tenured Teacher/Coaches 
Specifically, a non-tenured position does not 
give a teacher "expectancy of reemployment," re­
quiring procedural due process in order to dismiss. 
The requirements of procedural due process 
apply only where an individual is being deprived of 
his or her protected interests of liberty or pro­
perty. When the teacher/coach is being deprived of 
one of these interests, he or she must be granted 
some kind of prior hearing. The key question is, 
whether or not a non-tenured teacher/coach can 
establish liberty or property rights. 
22Ibid., p. 154. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF MAJOR COURT DECISIONS IN THE 
AREA OF THE REMOVAL OF A TEACHER/COACH 
FROM HIS COACHING POSITION ONLY 
Introduction 
Because teacher/coaches are in such an extra­
ordinary position in today's society, they find 
themselves extremely visible and, perhaps more than 
most professionals, subject to considerable praise 
or criticism. For years, most coaches have placed 
little emphasis on lawsuits. They have had little 
to fear from the courts since people simply did not 
sue coaches, nor did coaches sue others. This investi­
gator did not find a large number of cases related to 
teacher/coaching issues. However, this situation has 
changed, especially during the last ten to twenty years. 
The majority of lawsuits now appearing involving coaches 
deal with some area of employment. Coaches often go to 
court when discrimination is associated with sexual or 
racial bias. Also, they look for judicial relief in 
cases related to tenure, dismissal, divisible contracts, 
defamation of character and due process. 
Cases chosen for review in this chapter will con­
sider court cases of coaches on the secondary school 
level. They will review the issues placed before the 
court and the court's decision. It is im­
portant to examine the issues through actual case 
studies so that decision makers can obtain appropriate 
guidelines to facilitate decisions and policies that are 
legally as well as educationally sound. What follows 
is a categorized list of cases reviewed. 
Cases Relating To Due Process 
1. Genco v. Bristol Borough School District, 
423 A 2d 36 (1980). 
2. Tate v. Livingston Parish School Board, 
444 So. 2d 219 (1983). 
3. Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 
321 S.E. 2d 502 (1984). 
Case Relating To Race Discrimination 
1. Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 
712 F. 2d 1377 (1983). 
Cases Relating To Sex Discrimination 
1. Walter v. Independent School District No. 457, 
323 N.W. 2d 37 (1982). 
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2. Grebin v. Sioux Falls Independent School 
District, 779 F. 2d 18 (1985). 
Cases Relating To Continuing Tenure Contracts/ 
Separate Contracts For Extracurricular Activities 
1. Kirk v. Miller, 522 P. 2d 843 (1974). 
2. Chiodo v. Board of Education Of Special 
School District No. 1, 215 N.W. 2d 806 (1974). 
3. Leone v. Kimmell, 335 A. 2d 290 (1975). 
4. School Directors of District U-46 v. Kossoff, 
419 N.E. 2d 658 (1981) . 
5. Slockett v. Iowa Valley Community School Dis­
trict, 359 N.W. 2d 446 (1984). 
6. Hosaflook v. Nestor, 346 S.E. 2d 798 (1986). 
CASES RELATING TO DUE PROCESS 
Genco v. Bristol Borough School District 
423 A 2d 36 (1980). 
Facts 
Joseph D. Genco, who formerly held a school dis­
trict position of "Assistant to the Principal, Coor­
dinator of Physical Education, Athletics K-12 and Stu­
dent Affairs," here appeals from the Court of Common 
Pleas of Bucks County, which dismissed his appeal 
from the decision of the board of the Bristol 
Borough School District which purported to abolish 
that position, and reassign him to the position of 
classroom teacher.* 
The parties agree that Genco1s status as occu­
pant of the abolished position was that of a non­
professional employee of the district, and that 
Section 514 of the Public School Code of 19 49, Act 
of March 10, 1949, P. L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S, 
5-514, is the statute governing the present con­
troversy. The Supreme Court has stated, in Coleman 
v. Board of Education of the School District of 
Philadelphia that "section 514 establishes rights 
in a School District employee not to be dismissed 
without specific cause and not to be dismissed 
without due notice and a statement of reasons, and 
it establishes corresponding duties in the School 
District. It also establishes a right to a hearing." 
The district afforded Genco a hearing, on his 
demand, as the district solicitor had recommended at 
the time the board originally eliminated the pos­
ition. However, after the hearing, a majority of 
1 
Genco v. Bristol Borough School District, 
423 A 2d 36 (1980). 
^Ibid., p. 37. 
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the board concluded that the position had been 
abolished for budgetary and economic reasons; 
we note that the board's special counsel for 
the proceeding had recommended that the board 
rescind its action eliminating the position 
and reinstate Genco, on the ground that the 
evidence demonstrated that action not to have 
been based on financial considerations, but, 
rather, to have been an arbitrary and capricious 
action.^ 
Genco appealed to the lower court under the 
Local Agency Law, alleging that the position's 
elimination, and his consequent reassignment, were 
abuses of the board's discretion because they were 
actually undertaken solely in response to public 
pressure unrelated to the existence of the position, 
4 
but directed at Genco as its occupant. 
^Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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The trial court accepted the district's argument 
that financial considerations caused the board to 
eliminate the position; fhe court found the appli­
cable law to be that: 
Where, however, a non-professional employee 
is removed from his position for reasons of 
economy the protections of that section 
(Section 514) do not apply and the action is 
not an adjudication as such is defined in the 
Local Agency Law. Therefore, he has no right 
to a hearing nor to an appeal to this court 
under the Local Agency Law. See Sergi v. 
Pitttsburgh School District, 368 A 2d 1359 
(1977) and Pefferman v. School District of 
Pittsburgh, 387 A 2d 157 (1978).5 
The court agreed but adds only that the converse of 
that principle must be equally true, i.e., if the employ­
ee's removal or the elimination of the position was for 
reasons other than economy, the protections of Section 
514 do apply and the action is an adjudication under 
the Local Agency Law.^ 
The issue here, as in the trial court, is pre­
cisely as Judge Garb there stated: "In view of the 
foregoing, the only question remaining for disposition 
^Ibid. 
^Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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is whether appellant's termination from his pos­
ition as assistant to the principal, coordinator 
of physical education, athletics K-12 and stu-
7 dent affairs was for reasons of economy. 
Decision 
The court said,"Because the record does not pro­
vide any support for the abolition of the position, 
whether for economic reasons or any other legitimate 
impersonal management reason, we find it to be an 
arbitrary action which cannot be cured by the label 
of "economic reasons" ascribed to it by the board 
majority. 
We, the court, find that action to have been arbi­
trary, Genco's removal from the position can only 
be considered a disguised personnel action, and 
therefore an adjudication taken without regard to 
9 
the protections afforded employees by Section 514. 
As such, that personnel action must be con­
sidered a nullity. As in Coleman, supra, because 
^Ibid. 
®Ibid., p. 41. 
^Ibid. 
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"the School District provided (him) with no rea­
sons for (his removal), (he) has established a 
10 
clear legal right to reinstatement. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the or­
der of the trial court, and order that 
Joseph D. Genco be reinstated to the 
position of "Assistant to the Principal, 
Coordinator of Physical Education, Ath­
letics K-12 and Student Affairs," with 
back pay and benefits from the date of 
the ineffectual' action of the board 
abolishing the position, with due allow­
ance for sums earned by alternate employ­
ment in the period.^ 
Discussion 
The major importance of this case is that 
it laid down an analytical approach to addressing 
disguised personnel action taken by a school 
district. 
A statute which establishes rights of a school 
district employee not to be dismissed without specific 
cause, due notice and statement of reasons, does not 
10T ,  . ,  Ibid. 
11 
Ibid. 
4 
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apply to non-professional employees who are re­
moved from their positions for reasons of economy, 
but the statute does apply if the employee's re­
moval or the elimination of his position is for 
12 reasons other than economy. 
Creation and abolition of positions is within 
the power of school boards; the only limitation 
which should be imposed on exercise of such power 
is that a board must act intelligently, impartially 
13 
and with sound discretion. 
Tate v. Livingston Parish School Board 
444 So. 2d 219 (1983) 
Facts 
This matter was previously before the court on ap­
peal by the school board from a judgment in favor of 
plaintiff, David A. Tate, ordering the school 
board to "grant unto the plaintiff a due process 
hearing prior to the termination of, or failure to 
renew, plaintiff's contract as coach at Live Oak 
High School." The school board was further ordered 
^Ibid. , p. 36. 
13T, Ibid. 
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to restore to plaintiff all benefits of employment 
as coach, including salary, from June 2, 1977, until 
such time as the hearing was held. The judgment fur­
ther specified that the school board was not com­
pelled to hire Tate as a coach pending the hearing. 
The court reversed and set aside the judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff remanding the case to the 
14 
trial court for a new trial. 
The new trial was held on May 10, 1982, and 
judgment was rendered and signed on September 9, 
1982, against David A. Tate "to the extent that 
he is found to be not tenured as a coach and judg­
ment to that extent in favor of the Livingston 
Parish School Board." Tate has devolutively 
15 
appealed the judgment. We affirm. 
On appeal, the appellant specified as 
error that the trial court erred in determining 
that Tate did not enjoy tenure rights as a "coach 
14 
Tate v. Livingston Parish School Board, 
444 So. 2d 219 (1983). 
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of interscholastic sports" at the particular high 
16 
school where he had coached. 
David A. Tate was employed as a teacher and 
a coach of basketball and baseball at Live Oak 
High School in Livingston Parish, where he had 
served in both capacities for over six years. For 
the school year of 1977-78, plaintiff was given a 
teaching contract, but was not given a coaching 
contract. Admittedly, plaintiff has not been denied 
his position as teacher; he has been denied his pos­
ition as coach. Thus, the primary issue before this 
court is whether the position of "coach" is tenured 
under LSA-R.S. 17:441 et seq.1^ 
LSA-R.S. 17:441 defines "teacher" as follows: 
(1) Any employee of any parish or city school 
board who holds a teacher's certificate and whose 
legal employment requires such teacher's certificate. 
(2) Any school lunch supervisor employed by a 
parish or city school board who holds a special 
parish school lunch supervisor's certificate issued 
by the department of education of the State of 
18 
Louisiana and whose employment requires such certificate. 
1 6 ,  .  ,  
Ibid. 
17T, Ibid. 
18Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
It is clear from a reading of LSA-R.S. 17:441 
et seq. that the Teacher Tenure Act was designed 
to protect classroom teachers and administrators 
and supervisors in the teaching profession. Fur­
ther protection was expressly extended to such 
supervisory personnel holding special certificates. 
No specific inclusion of coaches of interscholastic 
extracurricular sports is made in the protective 
19 
statute. 
Decision 
Action was brought seeking due process hearing 
in connection with nonrenewal of high school teacher' 
coaching contract. On remand, the 21st Judicial Dis­
trict Court, Livingston Parish, Gordon E. Causey, Jr. 
rendered judgment against teacher and he devolutively 
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Covington, J., held 
that a high school athletic coach is not a "teacher" 
20 
within the meaning of Teacher Tenure Act. 
20Ibid., pp. 219-220. 
There is no merit to appellant's argument 
that he was "wrongfully terminated in violation 
of due process." Tate was not terminated or dis­
charged from his position as coach. The term of 
his contract expired. His contract was not re­
newed. Hence it was not necessary for the school 
board to provide a due process hearing under the 
circumstances of this case. 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court at appellant's costs. 
AFFIRMED.21 
Discussion 
While athletic coaches must be certified 
teachers of substantive school courses at the 
several instructional levels, they are not re­
quired by law to be certified as "coaches." As the 
court sees it, a teacher who is also employed as a 
coach by a school board has two sets of rights, 
21Ibid., p. 221. 
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e.g., (1) his position as a "teacher" is pro­
tected by tenure (if he has acquired tenure 
status); and, (2) his position as "coach" is 
protected by the contract he has to perform 
coaching duties, but not by tenure. Coaching 
duties are separate and distinct from regular 
22 
teaching or instructional duties. 
The Teacher Tenure Act was designed to protect 
classroom teachers and administrators and super-
23 
visors in the teaching profession. 
In areas which have been established for 
certification, a teacher can only teach in the 
24 area in which he has been certified. 
A high school athletic coach is not a 
"teacher" within the meaning of the Teacher Tenure 
Act, and hence, where teacher's coaching contract 
was not renewed the act, per se, did not require the 
25 school board to provide a due process hearing. 
22 
"ibid. 
23Ibid., p. 220. 
24,.. , 
Ibid. 
25tK. , Ibid. 
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Abell v. Nash County Board of Education 
321 S.E. 2d 502 (1984). 
Facts 
Plaintiffs Reams and Abell were probationary 
teachers and assistant football coaches at Northern 
Nash High School (NNHS). Neither had ever received 
any criticism from their supervisors, and both con­
sistently earned "satisfactory" evaluations during 
their two years at NNHS. At the end of the 1981-82 
school year, both received letters informing them 
that the defendant Board of Education had decided 
not to renew their contracts for the 1982-83 school 
year. No reason was given in the letters. Plaintiffs 
inquired of their principal, but received no explan­
ation why their contracts were not renewed. Having 
learned of nothing which would justify the Board's 
action, and otherwise believing that their perfor­
mance as teachers had been more than adequate, plain­
tiffs filed suit for reinstatement, back pay, and 
actual and punitive damages. The Board moved for 
and obtained summary judgment, and plaintiffs 
appealed.^ 
2 6 
Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 
321 S. E. 2d 502 (1984). p. 504. 
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Teachers in North Carolina are hired by local 
boards of education, upon the recommendation of 
their school superintendents. N. D. Gen. Stat. 
115C-299 (1983); see N. C. Gen Stat. 115C-35 to -48 
(1983) (duties of boards); N. C. Gen Stat. 115C-271 
to -278 (1983) (Superintendents). Non-renewal of 
contracts of probationary teachers is governed by 
N. C. Gen. Stat. 115C-325 (m) (2) (1983), which 
provides: 
The board, upon recommendation of the 
superintendent, may refuse to renew 
the contract of any probationary 
teacher or to reemploy any teacher 
who is not under contract for any 
cause it deems sufficient; Provided, 
however, that the cause may not be 
arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory27 
or for personal or political reasons. 
No statutory right of appeal exists. Probationary 
teachers who contend nonrenewal was for a prohibited 
reason therefore must sue in the appropriate court. 
Plaintiffs did so, alleging that the Board's action 
was arbitrary and capricious; summary judgment was 
28 
rendered against them. 
27 
Ibid. 
28 t ,  . ,  Ibid. 
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A party moving for summary judgment may pre­
vail if it meets the burden of proving an essen­
tial element of the opposing party's claim is non­
existent or by conclusively establishing a complete 
defense. If the moving party forecasts evidence 
which would entitle it to judgment as a matter of 
law, the non-moving party then must come forward 
with a forecast of evidence showing that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists for trial. The non-
movant may not rely on conclusory allegations un­
supported by facts. The evidence must be considered 
in the light most favorable to the non-movant with 
29 
all reasonable inferences therefrom. 
The Board's position was that it established a 
complete defense as a matter of law. It relies on 
the court's opinion in Hasty v. Bellcgny, 260 S.E. 2d 135 
(1979). There a probationary teacher's principal 
tried to get him to sign a letter which appeared to 
waive certain employment rights. When the teacher 
refused, the principal and the school superintendent 
recommended that the board not renew his contract. 
128 
After nonrenewal, the teacher sued and his complaint 
30 
was dismissed; on appeal, the court reversed. 
From plaintiff's complaint, two possibilities 
appear: (1) the board failed to renew plaintiff's 
contract because he refused to sign the letter of 
condition, or (2) the board failed to renew plain­
tiff's contract because the principal and super­
intendent recommended that he not be rehired. If 
the latter were proved to be the case, no violation 
of ... (G.S. 115C-325 (m) (2) ) would be established, 
since the superintendent is entitled to make such 
recommendations. If the plaintiff were able to 
prove (1) above, however, there would be a different 
i , 31 result. 
Hasty v. Bellamy, supra, (emphasis added). The 
court held that the plaintiff could pursue his claim, 
that the failure to renew, if based solely on his 
refusal to sign the letter, was arbitrary and 
. . 32 
capricious. 
Relying on the emphasized language, defendant 
board argues steadfastly that the superintendent and 
30Ibid., p. 505. 
31T,. , Ibid. 
32 J Ibid. 
principal recommended that the plaintiffs' con­
tracts not be renewed, and that its action 
therefore was not arbitrary and capricious as 
a matter of law. The board introduced minutes 
of the meeting at which the recommendation was 
made, with an attached list of teachers not 
offered renewal contracts. Plaintiffs were the 
only two teachers named thereon. The board also 
introduced an uncontradicted affidavit from the 
superintendent that he had recommended plaintiffs 
not be reemployed. Defendant contends that applying 
Hasty literally, this evidence sufficed to establish 
33 
a complete defense to plaintiff's action. 
Decision 
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court support the court's decision. In the landmark 
case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
that court, as in the present case, was asked to 
review an informal administrative decision with no 
hearing record or other required formal presentation 
of facts. The court held that ultimately the ques­
130. 
tion before it was a narrow one, i.e., whether the 
decision of the administrative agency was arbitrary -
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accor­
dance with law. To enable a reviewing court to 
make such a determination, the court ruled, the 
administrative record must disclose what factors the 
administrator considered in reaching the decision. 
See also Bowman Transportation v. Arkansas-Best 
tp • U4. 34 Freight. 
As noted above, the court does not require that a 
formal order be prepared each time a board of education 
decides not to renew a probationary teacher's contract, 
but the board's records should reflect the specific 
substantive reason for the nonrenewal of his contract. 
See Department of Correction v. Gibson, 301 S.E. 2d 
78 (1983) (racial discrimination case) (burden to 
35 
produce explanation on employer). 
With foregoing principles in mind, the court con­
cludes that the present record does not justify summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant board. As noted 
above, the board, as movant, bore the burden of es-
34Ibid., p. 507. 
35 
Ibid. 
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tablishing a rational reason for its action. The 
board offered only documents indicating that plain­
tiffs were recommended for cuts by the principal and 
the superintendent. One document, entitled "Worksheet" 
(author unknown), makes the following reference to 
plaintiff Reams: "Was tenured in Edgecombe County 
please keep him here I" Affidavits of the superinten­
dent and plaintiffs' principal stated that neither 
had recommended plaintiffs for renewal, for reasons 
which "were substantial and were related to the edu­
cational process of the Nash County public schools." 
Plaintiffs submitted counter-affidavits to the effect 
that they had talked repeatedly to the principal, who 
had told them he had recommended that their contracts 
be renewed. The evidence regarding the recommendation 
of the principal, plaintiffs' direct supervisor, thus 
conflicted sharply, and the substantive reasons ad­
vanced by the two administrators are too vague and 
f. conclusory to justify summary judgment. 
132.. 
Some substantive evidence in the record indi­
cates that positions at NNHS needed to be reduced 
by three from 52 to 49. No conclusive evidence was 
introduced to explain why only these two teachers 
were not renewed, out of seven originally recommended 
for nonrenewal. On the present record, - the court must 
conclude that summary judgment was improperly granted 
37 
to defendant board. 
The court does not believe, as the board contends, 
that our decision will result in a wave of litigation by 
disappointed teachers. Rather, it requires boards 
of education to be forthright about their actions. 
If a probationary teacher is not renewed, those who 
have made that decision simply must have a valid 
basis. On the present record, however, no such 
rational reason appears conclusively, and this court 
3 8 
accordingly does reverse. 
Discussion 
Probationary teachers who contend their non­
renewal was for a prohibited reason must sue in 
the appropriate court, since no statutory right 
39 
of appeal exists. 
37 , 
Ibid. 
38t. . , Ibid. 
39Ibid., p. 502. 
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Discretion of school boards with respect to 
dismissal of probationary teachers remains very 
broad after passage of statutes providing tenure 
for career teachers and listing allowable reasons 
for their dismissal or demotion, but decision not 
to renew probationary teacher's contract must have 
some non-arbitrary basis.^ 
A school board may refuse to renew a probation­
ary teacher's contract upon recommendation of the 
superintendent: that recommendation is only ad­
visory, however, and ultimate responsibility rests 
41 with the board. 
Statute providing tenure for career teachers 
imposes a duty on boards of education to determine 
substantive basis for recommendations of nonrenewal 
of probationary teachers and to assure that non­
renewal of probationary teachers is not for a pro­
hibited reason.^ 
Arbitrary or capricious reasons -For failing 
to rehire non-tenured teachers are those without 
any rational basis in the record, such that a de­
cision made thereon amounts to an abuse of discretion. 43 
40 
Ibid., p. 503 
41 
Ibid. 
42T, . , Ibid. 
43TV. , Ibid. 
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The advisory nature of a superintendent's recom­
mendation to a school board not to rehire a non-
tenured teacher places responsibility on the board 
to ascertain the rational basis for the recommenda-
44 
tion before acting upon it. 
By statute and under traditional common-law 
principles, superintendent and principal are agents 
45 
of the board of education. 
A board of education cannot escape responsibility 
for its actions, based on recommendations of its 
agents, including superintendent and principal, by 
simply refusing to inquire into their agents' reasons 
46 
for recommending dismissal of various teachers. 
A board of education must accept responsi­
bility if it decides to not renew a probationary 
teacher's contract on recommendations of its super­
intendent or principal which were made on improper 
grounds does not mean that the board must make ex­
haustive inquiries or formal findings of fact, but 
only that the administrative record, be it the per­
sonnel file, board minutes or recommendation memor-
47 anda should disclose basis for the board's actions. 
44T, . , Ibid. 
45t, . , Ibid. 
46T, Ibid. 
47TV. , Ibid. 
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CASE RELATING TO RACE DISCRIMINATION 
Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 
712 F. 2d 1377 (1983). 
Facts 
The black plaintiffs, who were or had been coaches 
with the city board of education, brought Title VII em­
ployment discrimination suit. 
Rufus Harris, George Moore, and Bobby Minard, 
are black teacher/coaches in the Birmingham, Alabama 
school system. Each has served as an assistant foot­
ball coach. Moore has also served as a head basket­
ball coach. They claim that the Birmingham board of 
education (BOE) discriminated against them, and other 
black coaches, by hiring them to head coach and assis-
49 tant coach positions only in black schools. 
Tn 1971, Bill Harris, white athletic director, 
selected Rufus Harris to transfer to Ramsey High 
School to become the school's first black assistant 
coach. Harris, unhappy with the decision, orally 
requested a return to historically black Carver High 
School at the end of the school year. His request 
48 
Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education, 
712 F. 2d 1377 (1983). 
49 
Ibid., p. 1374 
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was granted. Upon his return to Carver, Harris 
served as an assistant football coach. In 1972, 
when the head football coach position became vacant, 
James Lowe, the black principal, told Harris that he 
would be recommended to fill the vacancy. Instead, 
the principal selected Willie Peake, a black coach. 
Harris was later replaced as assistant coach by 
another black coach. Harris claims his transfer to 
Carver and subsequent discharge were racially moti­
vated. The court finds nothing in the record to sup­
port such a finding. 
In the spring of 1973, E. E. Thompson, the 
black principal of Parker High School, began 
searching for a head football coach. Minard was 
an assistant football coach at Parker High during 
the 1972-73 school year. Minard, however, never 
formally expressed an interest in the head coach 
position to Thompson. Subsequently, Cecil Leonard 
a black, was chosen for the job. Minard, assuming 
that he had been excluded from the staff, did not 
participate in spring training. He was replaced by 
Wendell Jones and Alvin Griffin, black assistant 
50T, . , Ibid. 
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coaches. Minard later requested a transfer to Glenn, 
Carver, or Jackson-Olin High Schools to teach driver 
education. Board director, Dr. Goodson, a black, 
offered Minard the choice of four elementary schools. 
Minard selected Lewis Elementary, where he taught 
physical education. Later, he transferred to Glenn 
High School. During Minard's tenure at Glenn High 
he nevfer applied for any of several coaching posi­
tions. Minard claims that his assignment and dis­
charge from Parker High was racially motivated. Ex­
amination of the record reveals no support for these 
, 51 
charges. 
In 1973, the head football coach position at 
Jones Valley High School became vacant. The duty to 
find a replacement fell to Simpson Pepper, the white 
principal of Jones Valley High School. Pepper turned 
to Bill Harris, the board's athletic director, to 
assist him in the search for a head football coach. 
During their search, however, they did not consider 
Moore for the position. Pepper indicated that he 
assumed that Moore was happy as head basketball 
coach and therefore did not consider Moore. Pepper 
< 
stated the board had a long-standing policy against 
an individual holding head football and head basket­
ball coaching positions. Bill Harris recommended 
Herbert Bruce, the disenchanted white head football 
coach at Phillips pigh School to fill the Jones 
tt i , 52 Valley vacancy. 
Phillips High is a predominantly black high 
school. During his term as coach at Phillips, Bruce 
experienced problems maintaining and building its 
football program. Billy T. Marsh, the white prin­
cipal of Phillips High, wanted Bruce replaced by a 
black head football coach. Bruce wanted the head 
coach position at prediminantly white Jones Valley. 
Pepper, principal at Jones Valley, hired Bruce. Thi 
created a head football coaching vacancy at Phillips 
When Marsh turned to Bill Harris for advice, Harris 
53 
suggested Moore. 
After an interview, Marsh offered the head 
football coach job to Moore. Moore requested Harris 
and Minard as his assistants. Marsh denied the re­
quest. Moore later rejected Marsh's offer. Moore 
52 
Ibid. 
53T, . , Ibid. 
spent the 1973-74 school year.at Jones Valley High 
as an assistant football coach and head basketball 
coach. A year later, at Bruce's request, Moore re 
signed as assistant football coach. By 1975, his­
torically white Jones Valley High had enrolled a 
large number of black students. Bruce, again dis­
satisfied, left Jones Valley High after two years 
as head football coach. He transferred to predom­
inantly white Gardendale High School in the Jeffer 
son County school system. John Galloway, one of 
Bruce's white assistant coaches, replaced him at 
Jones Valley. Pepper, in reaching his decision 
to hire Galloway again assumed Moore's lack of 
interest in a head football coach position. Peppe 
based this assumption on Moore's refusal to serve 
as head football coach at Phillips. Moore claims 
the decision not to consider him was racially 
54 
motivated. 
54Ibid., pp. 1379-1380. 
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Decision 
The Court of Appeals, Hatchett, Circuit Judge, 
held that in this Title VII discrimination in employ­
ment case, this court must determine whether the trial 
court erred in finding that appellants were not victims 
of hiring or promotion discrimination because of their 
race. Finding that the*trial court, 537 F. Supp. 716, 
was clearly erroneous in its findings as to one appel-
55 
lant, this court affirms in part, and reverses in part. 
The court holds that the trial court's finding on 
the ultimate issue of discrimination is clearly erroneous 
and that the case was decided under an erroneous view 
of the controlling law regarding the weight to be 
given to past history of discrimination, lack of 
standards, and lack of objective criteria for hiring 
and promotion. Having so concluded, the court does re­
verse the district court's dismissal under rule 41 (b), 
Fed. R. Civ. P.56 
Discusssion 
The record did not support claim that transfer 
and subsequent discharge of black teacher/coaches 
57 
was racially motivated. 
55Ibid., pp. 1378-1379. 
56Ibid., p. 1384. 
57Ibid., p. 1377. 
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In Title VII employment discrimination suit, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proving by prepon­
derance of evidence a prima facie case of discrim­
ination, and if he succeeds in proving such case, 
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for employee's 
rejection, should defendant carry such a burden, 
plaintiff must have the opportunity to prove by the 
preponderance of evidence that reasons offered by 
defendant were not its true reasons, but were pre-
5 8 
text for discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
"Factual inquiry" in Title VII case is whether 
defendant intentionally discriminated against plain­
s'} 
tiff. Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
In an employment discrimination suit brought by 
black teacher/coach, failure of board of education 
to promulgate objective standards or policies re­
garding hiring of head coaches within school system 
contributed to establishment of prima facie Title VII 
case. Civil Rights Case of 1964.^ 
58t, . , Ibid. 
59Ibid., p. 1378. 
60T, Ibid. 
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In Title VII employment discrimination suit 
against school board, proof of immediate past his­
tory of racial discrimination may be established 
by showing an existence of various desegregation 
fi 1 
orders. Civil Rights Acts of 1964. 
In a black coach-teacher's Title VII employ­
ment discrimination suit, statistical evidence, 
showing of only subjective hiring standards and 
history of past racial discrimination was enough 
to compel finding of employment discrimination. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.^^ 
To rebut presumption arising from prima facie 
case established by black teacher/coach in Title VII 
employment discrimination suit, defendant board of 
education had to clearly set forth, through intro­
duction of admissable evidence, reasons for teacher/ 
coach's rejection; board had to produce evidence 
that teacher/coach was rejected or that someone else 
was preferred for a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
6 3 
reason. Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
61T, • , Ibid. 
62 t ,  .  ,  Ibid. 
63 . j Ibid. 
Defendant board of education in a black teacher/ 
coach's Title VII employment discrimination suit 
failed to rebut presumption that teacher/coach was 
victim of employment discrimination where board gave 
as reason for rejection a false assumption by one of 
its agents that teacher/coach was not interested in 
head football coaching position and where situation 
in which board placed itself was caused by subjective 
selection process utilized; under such procedure, no 
legitimate reason for rejection could be shown. 
6 4  
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
As a general rule, court could not grant de­
fendant's motion for involuntary dismissal at close 
of plaintiff's case, but should allow defendant to 
introduce evidence before entering final judgment; 
only in instances where plaintiff has not met his 
burden should such dismissal be granted.^ 
^"*Ibid. 
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CASES RELATING TO SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Walter v. Independent School District No. 457, 
323 N.W. 2d 37 (1982). 
Facts 
This is an appeal by Independent School District 
No. 457 from an order of the Martin County District 
Court declaring that the School District violated 
Minn. Stat. 125:12 Subd. 6b (1980) by failing to 
offer respondent Rolf Walter, a teacher who had been 
placed on unrequested leave of absence, a two-fifths 
6 6 
teaching position that had become available. 
Walter brought this action under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act, Minn. Stat. 555.01-.16 
(1980). He sought monetary damages, reinstatement 
to a full-time position, and declaration that the 
School District had violated Minn. Stat. 125.12 
Subd. 6b (1980), which provides for the reinstatement 
of teachers on unrequested leave. The school district 
contended that Walter did not have a valid teaching 
license when the two-fifths position became avail­
able, that the coaching position that was part of the 
two-fifths offer conflicted with the coaching position 
to which he was already assigned, and it was necessary 
6 6 
Walter v. Independent School District No. 457, 
323 N.W. 2d 37 (1982)., p. 38. 
to hire a female applicant to comply with affir­
mative action requirements. A court trial was 
held on May 6, 1980. In its order dated August 30, 
1980, the court found that Walter was on unrequested 
leave of absence with respect to two-fifths of a 
full-time position at the time that a two-fifths 
vacancy occurred, and that the school district has 
violated both the statute and Walter's teaching con­
tract by failing to offer him the two-fifths teaching 
67 
position. 
Rolf Walter has been employed by appellant, a 
small school district in Southern Minnesota, since 
the beginning of the 1969-70 school year. He has 
taught German, ninth-grade mathematics, and both 
boys' and girls' health and physical education in 
the Trimont school system. He has also coached 
6 8 
boys' basketball and football. 
The Trimont school district discovered the edu­
cational advantages of having at least one woman 
physical education instructor with its first such 
teacher, Garla Anderson's CETA-funded predecessor, 
Barbara Schutt. The district wanted to continue to 
Ibid. 
68 t ,  .  ,  Ibid. 
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make that educational opportunity available to its 
female students. Superintendent Harold Remme, in 
recommending to the school board at its August 29, 
1979 meeting that Garla Anderson be offered the two-
fifths position, gave the following reasons: (1) that 
it is important that female students have a woman 
teacher in physical education and health so that they 
can ask questions and be counseled in very personal 
matters; (2) that the girls' locker room can be more 
adequately supervised by a female physical education 
teacher; and (3) that it is important to have a fe­
male coach for girls' sports, both to serve as role 
model and to supervise the locker room. Experienced 
as Mr. Walter may be as a physical education instruc­
tor, he does not possess these qualifications. Much, 
as he needs and should have a full-time teaching 
position within the district, he should not have that 
position at the educational expense of the girls in 
the Trimont junior and senior high school. The admin­
istrative decision of the Trimont school district in 
this regard, being neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, 
69 
should be upheld. 
^Ibid., p. 44. 
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Decision 
The court took the position that the legislature in 
tended to give school boards the discretion to conclude, 
dependently, that a teacher should not be reinstated 
because he or she lacks certain "special qualifications" 
beyond those required by the licensing authority. Both 
the Department of Education and, at one time, the 
Trimont School District, considered Rolf Walter to be 
sufficiently qualified to teach girls' physical edu­
cation. If certain exceptions must be made to ensure 
the availability of female teachers for positions of 
the type in question, the legislature may amend the 
statute accordingly. As it is now written, however, 
section 125.12 contains no such exceptions. Walter 
possesses all of the qualifications that the statute 
requires for full reinstatement; a license and seniority 
It is evident that, but for the fact that he is male, 
he would have been awarded the position. Subdivision 
6b (d) requires that teachers be reinstated to the same 
positions they held or "to other available positions 
in the school district in fields in which they are 
148 
licensed." Pursuant to subdivision 6b(d), Walter 
must be awarded the two-fifths girls' physical edu­
cation position. To permit the school board to re­
quire additional qualifications would deprive him 
and other tenured, experienced teachers of the pro-
70 
tection that section 125.12 was intended to provide. 
Discussion 
A school district may exercise its own discretion 
71 
in hiring the most qualified teachers. 
A school district could reasonably conclude that 
a woman might be a better girls' physical education 
instructor than a man would be; such a determination, 
made as part of a hiring decision, generally would be 
an administrative decision not subject to review 
72 unless found to be arbitrary or unreasonable. 
Whether a formerly full-time teacher may be con­
sidered fully reinstated upon being given a part-time 
73 position is a question of law reviewable on appeal. 
A full-time teacher who had been placed on un-
requested leave of absence pursuant to statute pro­
viding for reinstatement of teachers on unrequested 
70 ., 
Ibid., p. 43. 
7*Ibid., p. 37. 
72Ibid. 
73Ibid. 
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leave and who then accepted a part-time position 
remained on unrequested leave to the extent of the 
remainder of full-time position and had to be offered 
any part-time position, for which he was licensed, 
74 
sufficient to restore him to full-time status. 
A full-time teacher who has been placed on un­
requested leave of absence pursuant to Minn. Stat. 
125.12 subd. 6b (1980) and who then accepts a part-
time position remains on unrequested leave to the 
extent of the remainder of the full-time position 
and must be offered any part-time position, for which 
he is licensed, sufficient to restore him to full-
time status. 
Grebin v. Sioux Falls Independent School District, 
779 F. 2d 18 (1985). 
Facts 
A 43 year old female applicant for English 
teaching position at school brought age and sex 
discrimination actions following the hiring of a 
27 year old male applicant. The District Court, 
John B. Jones, J., entered an adverse verdict in the 
^Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
7 5T, . , Ibid. 
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sex discrimination claim, and entered judgment 
on adverse jury verdict in age discrimination 
7 6 
claim, and applicant appealed. 
Janet Grebin appealed from an adverse court 
verdict in her claim under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. 2000e, for 
sex discrimination and from an adverse jury verdict 
in her claim under 29 U.S.C. 626 for age discrim­
ination . 77 
Grebin was 43 years old when she was considered 
for the ninth-grade English teaching position at 
Axtell Park Junior High School for the 1983-84 school 
year. Grebin's prior teaching experience consisted of 
one semester as an English teacher in Chester, South 
Dakota, and three years as a substitute with the 
defendant Sioux Falls School District (Sioux Falls). 
For one semester of that three-year period, she 
taught civics at Axtell Park. Her application for 
full-time teaching employment had been on file with 
Sioux Falls since March, 1980. The job was not given 
to Grebin, but instead to 27 year old Jeff Herbert. 
Herbert had three years experience as a full-time 
7 6 
Grebin v. Sioux Falls Independent School District, 
779 F 2d 18 (1985). 
77Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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teacher and coach. During two of those three years, 
7 8 
he taught English. 
Grebin commenced this action in February, 1984, 
alleging that she was not hired for the English pos­
ition at Axtell Park because of her age and her sex. 
A jury returned a verdict for the defendant on the 
age discrimination count, and the court dismissed her 
sex discrimination claim.^ 
Grebin's attack on the trial court's rejection 
of her sex discrimination claim is two-fold. First, 
she claims the court erred by failing to address 
certain "admissions11 the defendant made at the trial. 
Second, that the content of these "admissions" renders 
the court's decision "clearly erroneous." For re­
versal of the jury's determination of her age dis­
crimination claim, Grebin alleges several procedural 
errors on the part of the trial court: (1) it impro­
perly granted defendant's motion in limine; (2) it 
improperly instructed the jury on the burden of proof 
and inferences it could make; and (3) it refused to 
instruct the jury on the "willfulness" element of a 
8 0 
discrimination action. 
X kJ Am U • 
Ibid. 
80 t ,  .  ,  Ibid. 
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The trial court determined that Grebin estab­
lished a prima facie case in accordance with 
McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 L. Ed. 2d 668 
(1973). It found that Grebin is a member of a pro­
tected minority, she applied and was qualified for 
the job in question, she was not hired, and defen­
dant continued to seek applicants with similar 
qualifications. In response, the defendants asserted 
that they hired Jeff Herbert because he was the best 
qualified candidate for the position. Grebin attempted 
to prove that this reason was a pretext for discrim­
ination, but the trial court concluded that she did 
81 
not meet this burden. 
Grebin claimed this conclusion was erroneous be­
cause the court did not refer, in its memorandum, 
to certain admissions by the defendants. The importance 
of the alleged admissions is that Jeff Herbert's foot­
ball coaching ability was a factor in the district's 
82 
decision to hire him. 
8 1 , . ,  
Ibid. 
82 t ,  .  ,  Ibxd. 
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Grebin claimed the trial court erred by granting 
defendants' motion in limine which prevented her 
from introducing any evidence of alleged discrimin­
atory conduct which occurred 180 days or more before 
she filed charges with the EEOC. The evidence she 
points to concerns that selection process for several 
teaching positions which opened up during the period 
in which she had her application on file with the 
A- 4- • 4- 83 district. 
This court will not disturb evidentiary rulings 
absent a showing that prejudice resulted. Here, the con­
sideration does not include whether the alleged evidence 
of prior discrimination was improperly excluded because 
Grebin was not prejudiced by its exclusion. In at 
least two of those openings the person hired was 
over 40, and in a third opening, Grebin conceded 
that the selection was "fair." This evidence, had it 
been admitted, would not have furthered Grebin's action 
for age discrimination. Therefore, the ruling was 
84 
prejudicial and must not be disturbed. 
®^Ibid., p. 20. 
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Decision 
The Court of Appeals, Heaney Circuit Judge, 
held that: (1) finding that school district had a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring 
applicant was sufficiently supported to support 
judgment on sex discrimination claim; (2) any error 
in evidentiary ruling on other alleged discriminatory 
conduct was not prejudicial; and (3) any error in 
failure to give instructions concerning existence of 
"willful" age discrimination was harmless in light of 
O C 
the jury's finding that there was no discrimination. 
The trial court determined that Grebin had not 
presented sufficient evidence of willful discrimin­
ation to warrant such an instruction. The court need 
not determine the propriety of this ruling. If the court 
erred in not instructing the jury on willfulness, that 
error could not have been prejudicial in this case 
because the jury found the defendants not liable. The 
jury determined that the defendants did not discrim­
inate against Grebin. Thus, they never would have 
reached the question of whether defendants "willfully" 
discriminated against her. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 pro-
^Ibid., p. 18. 
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vides that errors which do not affect the substantial 
rights of parties shall be disregarded. The court finds 
that Grebin's substantial rights could not possibly 
have been affected by the absence of "willfulness" 
instruction since the jury had no cause to consider 
this question.®^ 
The school district established sufficient 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring 
female applicant for ninth grade English teaching 
position to support finding of no sex discrimination 
in light of female applicant's limited experience of 
one semester as a regular teacher and three years as 
a substitute, and male applicant's three years of 
regular teaching experience, including outstanding 
recommendations, although an additional factor in 
employment decision was his ability to coach football. 
07 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The reviewing court was not required to consider 
whether alleged evidence of prior age discrimination 
was improperly excluded since claimant was not pre­
judiced by exclusion where evidence would not have 
88 
furthered claim for age discrimination. 
86Ibid., p. 21 
®^Ibid., p. 18 
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Any error in trial court's ruling in age dis­
crimination action that teaching applicant had not 
presented sufficient evidence of willful discrimin­
ation by school board to warrant an instruction was 
not prejudicial where jury found that school did not 
discriminate against applicant, and thus did not reach 
89 
question of willfulness. 
CASES RELATING TO CONTINUING (TENURE) CONTRACTS/ 
SEPARATE CONTRACTS FOR EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES 
Kirk v. Miller, 
522 P. 2d 843 (1974). 
Facts 
Two school teachers sought declaratory judgment or 
writ of mandamus to either compel school board to 
issue contracts identical to those they had received 
in prior years or to declare that two form contracts, 
one for curricular activities and one for extracurri­
cular activities, impinged upon their rights under 
the continuing contract law. The Superior Court, 
Pierce County, Horace G. Geer, J., dismissed and the 
90 teachers appealed. 
90Kirk v. Miller, 522 P. 2d 843 (1974). 
Until the end of the 1972 school year, the 
defendants, directors of White River School Dis­
trict No. 416, offered to the plaintiffs, certi­
fied teachers of the district, a single form 
contract that contained provisions for curricular 
activities and extracurricular activities ("special 
assignments"), with the extracurricular activities 
segregated both by description and salary. 
In April, 1972, the defendants proposed to 
offer plaintiffs two contracts, one encompassing 
curricular work and pay, and the other for extra­
curricular work and pay. The defendants intended 
that the curricular contract be subject to the con­
tinuing contract law, and that the supplementary 
contract not be so subject under RCW 28A.67.074, 
which specifically provides for and exempts supple­
mental contracts from the continuing contract law. 
The school board does now employ all plaintiffs; 
there is no question here of wrongful termination or 
refusal to renew a contract of a particular teacher. 
^^Ibid., p. 844. 
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Plaintiffs sought an alternate writ of mandate 
or declaratory judgment to either compel the school 
board to issue them contracts identical to those 
they had received prior to 1972 (single form), or to 
declare that the two-form contract impinged upon 
their rights as teachers under the continuing con­
tract law. The trial court initially issued the 
alternate writ, but following hearing and presenta­
tion of defendants' case, dismissed the plaintiffs' 
cause of action. The court held that: (1) the con­
tinuing contract law was intended to apply only to 
curricular activities, and (2) the defendant school 
board was able, under RCW 28A.67.074, to issue 
supplemental contracts providing for extracurricular 
activities that were not covered by the continuing 
92 
contract law. 
This case then raises initially a question of 
statutory construction of the continuing contract law, 
RCW 28A.67.070, and secondly, a question of statutory 
interpretation, which is one of first impression, of 
159 
the interface between the continuing contract law 
and RCW 28a. 67.074.93 
That interface is clarified by the following state­
ments: no certified employee shall be required to per­
form duties not described in the contract unless a 
new or supplemental contract is made, except that 
in an unexpected emergency the board of directors or 
school district administration may require the em­
ployee to perform other reasonable duties on a 
94 
temporary basis. 
No supplemental contract shall be subject to 
the continuing contract provisions of Titles 28A or 
95 
28B. 
Decision 
From a reading of the statutes, it appears that 
the legislature felt a distinction between certified 
or curricular duties and extracurricular duties. It 
recognized this distinction by authorizing a school 
district to utilize a supplemental contract as a means 
of contracting for the performance of any extracur­
ricular duty or special assignment. Before this time 
it appears that school districts were authorized only 
to issue a single-form contract which was to include 
93Ibid., pp. 844-845 
94 
Ibid. 
95T, . , Ibid. 
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both curricular and extracurricular duties. Since 
the court has held that special assignments are not in 
any event covered under the continuing contract law, 
and because of the express disclaimer contained in 
RCW 28A.67.07 4, the court holds that such a supple­
mental contract covering these assignments will not be 
governed by the continuing contract provisions of 
RCW 28A.67.074. Since there is involved here no 
question of nonrenewal or wrongful termination of a 
special assignment, the court does not feel it appro­
priate to entertain any question concerning a termin­
ation following the execution of such a supplemental 
contract.^ 
The Supreme Court, Hamilton, J., held that con­
tinuing contract provisions did not relate to con­
tracts for extracurricular activities; and that 
school district had the power to offer separate 
97 
contracts for special assignments. 
^Ibid. , p. 846. 
^Ibid. , p. 843. 
161. 
Discussion 
Reference in continuing contract statute to 
"holding a position as such" means a teaching or 
administrative position, and does not refer to 
98 
extracurricular responsibilities. 
Teacher's right to hold a special assignment, 
such as coaching or advising a special interest club, 
is in no way vested and special assignments held by 
99 
teachers are not covered by continuing contract law. 
Special assignments for teacher and stipends there­
fore constitute a severable portion of teacher's con­
tract which is not subject to continuing contract 
. . 100 
provisions. 
School board may legally execute a separate con­
tract with teacher covering special assignments in 
years subsequent to those in which special assign­
ments were included in contract which provided for 
curricular responsibilities and such a severed, supple­
mental contract is not governed by continuing contract 
9 8 , .  ,  
Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 844, 
100T ,  Ibid. 
101T, Ibid. 
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Chiodo v. Board of Education 
Of Special School District No. 1, 
215 B,W, 2d 806 (1974) 
Facts 
A coach brought an action for declaratory judg­
ment that he had acquired tenure as a basketball 
coach pursuant to statute. From a judgment of the 
District Court, Hennepin County, Crane Winton, J., 
denying the coach's motion for summary judgment and 
granting a motion by the defendants for summary 
judgment, the coach appealed.*^ 
Plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory 
judgment that he had acquired tenure as a basketball 
coach under the provision of Minn. St. 125.17. This 
appeal is from a judgment entered pursuant to an 
order granting defendants motion for summary judg­
ment and denying plaintiff's motion for summary 
• ^ 4. 1°3 judgment. 
Plaintiff is a certified teacher who has been 
employed by defendant Minneapolis school board as a 
social studies teacher since 1954. His position as 
1 0 2  
Chiodo v. Board of Education of Special 
School District No. 1, 215 N.W. 2d 806 (1974). 
103 
Ibid., p. 807. 
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a tenured teacher of social studies is not involved 
in this action. In addition to these teaching duties, 
plaintiff has served in various coaching positions, 
including that of head basketball coach from 1962 
until June, 1972. Plaintiff is certified as a head 
basketball coach pursuant to Minnesota State Board 
of Education regulations.^^ 
In the spring of 1972, plaintiff was informed 
that he would not be reappointed as head basketball 
coach for the 1972-73 school year. This decision was 
made by the school principal under authority delegated 
to him to appoint each year from the teachers at that 
105 school those who would coach each sport. 
Plaintiff requested a written statement of the 
reasons why he was not being reappointed and a hearing 
on the matter. Both requests were denied. The sole 
issue before this court is whether plaintiff has 
acquired tenure as basketball coach so as to be en­
titled to the protections of the teacher tenure act 
, ,, . ... 106 
as to that position. 
Ibid. 
105T,. , Ibid. 
106_, . , 
Ibid. 
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The teacher tenure act for cities of the first 
class is Minn. St. 125.17. It applies to the teachers 
of Special School District No. 1 since the district's 
boundaries are coterminous with the boundaries of the 
City of Minneapolis. Minn. St. 125.17, subd. 3, pro­
vides in pertinent part that after the completion of a 
107 
3-year probationary period without discharge, 
"***such teachers as are thereupon re-employed shall 
continue in service and hold their respective posi­
tion during good behavior and efficient and competent 
service and shall not be discharged or demoted except 
for cause after a hearing."1^® 
Minn. St. 125.17, subd. 1 (a), defines the key 
word "teacher' as follows: 
"The term 'teacher' includes every person regu­
larly employed as a principal, or to give instruction 
in a classroom, or to superintend or supervise class­
room instruction, or as placement teacher and visiting 
teacher. Persons, regularly employed as counselors and 
school librarians shall be covered by these sections as 
teachers if certificated as teachers or as school 
. .. . „ 110 
librarians. 
107T, . , Ibid. 
108 t ,  .  ,  Ibid. 
Ibid 
H0T, . , Ibid. 
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Plaintiff contends (1) that his certification 
as head basketball coach pursuant to state board 
of education regulations establishes him as a 
"teacher"; (2) that an analysis of coaching func­
tions brings a coach within the statutory defini­
tion of a teacher as anyone "regularly employed*** 
to give instruction in a classroom, or to superin­
tend or supervise classroom instruction;" and (3) that 
the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the trial 
court's decision because the court's reasoning, in­
corporated by memorandum into the order, included 
assumptions of fact neither supported by affidavit 
111 not stipulated. 
Defendants argue that the statutory definition 
of "teacher" is exclusive and should be strictly 
interpreted to include only basic teaching positions, 
1 1 2  
not extracurricular duties or assignments. 
Decision 
This court has held that the enumeration in the 
statute of those entitled to the benefits of the 
teacher tenure act is exclusive. Board of Education 
11:LIbid., pp. 807-808. 
H2_, . , 
Ibid. 
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v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W. 2d 689 (1948). 
Since the position of coach is not expressly in­
cluded, it is not subject to tenure rights unless 
a person holding that position is a person regu­
larly employed to give instruction in a classroom 
113 
within the meaning of the act. 
Also rebutting the argument for a broad defin­
ition of classroom teacher is the fact that the 
statute specifies several types of teachers, for 
example, counselors and librarians, in addition to 
the classroom teacher. The legislature could have 
specifically included coaches within the definition 
of teacher if it had intended that they be covered 
114 
by the tenure act. 
This court is not impressed by the contention that 
certification as a coach confers tenure upon the coaching 
position. Certification as a criterion of tenure was 
rejected by this court in Eelkema v. Board of Education, 
215 Minn. 590, 11 N.W. 2d 76 (1943).115 
Ibid. 
U4T, Ibid. 
115T, Ibid. 
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There is no case in Minnesota governing the 
issue presented by the appeal but several decisions 
from other state courts are brought to the court's 
attention by defendants and by amicus curiae. 
While all these decisions can be distinguished on 
their facts, or on differences in the tenure acts or 
certification requirements, they are significant in 
their unanimity in denying tenure to coaches and 
1.1 6 
other similar positions. 
The court has considered plaintiff's assertion that 
the trial court's decisior in part was based on an assump­
tion of unsupported facts. The decision of the trial 
court was based on several reasons, only one of which 
involved the challenged assumption. This court need 
not sustain a correct decision for the same reason or for 
all the reasons relied upon the trial court. The court 
does not think that particular portion of the trial court's 
117 
memorandum is essential to an affirmation in this case. 
116., .. 
Ibid. 
117..,. 
Ibid. 
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Discussion 
Under the statute defining "teacher," for tenure pur­
poses, as every person regularly employed as principal, 
or to give instruction in a classroom, or to superin­
tend or supervise classroom instruction or as place­
ment teacher and visiting teacher, and persons regu­
larly employed as counselors and school librarians if 
certificated as teachers or as school librarians, a 
coach, though certified as such, was not a "teacher" 
118 
and did not acquire tenure. 
Words of the statute are to be viewed in their 
119 
setting, not isolated from context. 
Likewise, the common meaning of the word "class­
room" might include a gymnasium where basketball is 
taught. But words of a statute are to be viewed in 
their setting, not isolated from their context. If 
"classroom" were intended to include every location 
where instruction takes place, its presence in the 
120 
language of the statute would be superfluous. 
118Ibid., pp. 806-807. 
119 
Ibid., p. 806. 
120 
Ibid., p. 808. 
169 
The Supreme Court held that under a statute 
defining "teacher," for tenure purposes, as every 
person regularly employed, as a principal, or to 
give instruction in a classroom, or to superintend 
or supervise classroom instruction or as a placement 
teacher and visiting teacher, and persons regularly 
employed as counselors and school librarians if 
certificated as teachers or as school librarians, 
the coach, though certified as such, was not a 
121  "teacher" and did not acquire tenure. 
Leone v. Kimmel 
335 A. 2d 290 (1975). 
Facts 
Suit was brought by an assistant football coach 
seeking to nullify action of board of education in 
not awarding a contract to coach for football season. 
On cross motions for summary judgment, the Supreme 
Court, Kent County, Christie, J., held that failure 
121 
Ibid., p. 806. 
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to grant a new contract was not a matter within 
the coverage of professional negotiations agree­
ment which provides that, interalia, no teacher 
shall be reduced in rank or compensation or de­
prived of any professional advantage without just 
cause and that any such alleged action by board 
shall be subject to grievance procedures set forth 
1 2 2  
in agreement. 
This suit arises upon plaintiff's petition 
for declaratory judgment, writ of certiorari and/ 
or appeal seeking to nullify certain actions of the 
defendants, who constitute the Milford School Board. 
Both the defendants and the plaintiff have moved 
123 for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff, John A. Leone, is a teacher in the 
Milford School District. For five years before this 
case arose, he served as a teacher and also as assis­
tant coach of the Milford High School football team. 
The duties that he undertood as assistant coach 
were in addition to his responsibilities in the class-
122Leone v. Kimmel, 335 A. 2d 290 (1975). 
123Ibid., p. 291. 
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room and were performed outside of normal school 
hours under a special separate contract. For these 
additional services, he received compensation in the 
amount of five hundred dollars at the end of each 
124 
football season. 
Each year a new supplemental contract was 
executed between the plaintiff and the School Board. 
So each year the Board decided again to appoint the 
plaintiff.as assistant coach and specified the com­
pensation. The last such contract was entered into 
on August 15, 1972. Upon completion of the 1972 
football season the plaintiff was paid for his ser-
125 
vices in accordance with the contract. 
Plaintiff also had a "Professional Employee 
Contract." This contract was dated June 1, 1972, 
and covered those services rendered by the plaintiff 
as a regular certified teacher during school sessions. 
This contract is not involved in the dispute before 
4-u 4. 126 the court. 
124 , . , 
Ibid. 
125 , . , 
Ibid. 
1 2 6 t ,  .  ,  Ibid. 
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The defendant school board held an informal 
meeting December 5, 1972, at which time it voted 
not to offer new coaching contracts for 1973 to 
the coach and assistant coach, the plaintiff 
herein. The next day, the coaches were informed 
of the board's decision and were urged to resign. 
127 
Each of them refused to do so. 
Thereafter, a formal meeting of the board was 
held December 11, 1972. Although no written notice 
of the meeting was given the coaches, they requested 
the right to be present. That right was granted and 
they were present. Upon conclusion of the regular 
board meeting, the school board went into executive 
session for the purpose of discussing personnel 
matters. The board then discussed the coaching 
situation, and the coaches were given a chance to 
make a presentation to the board. Thereafter, a vote 
was taken by secret ballot, and the board formally 
decided not to award contracts to the coaches for the 
1973 football season. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Both coaches brought suit in this court seeking 
129 
to nullify the board's action. 
In a separate action in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, the coaches filed suit seeking an injunc­
tion prohibiting the defendants from hiring any 
persons other than themselves to coach the Milford 
High football team during the 197 3 season, Vice-
Chancellor William Marvel, in a decision dated 
April 5, 1973, denied injunctive relief. The court 
held that the provisions of 14 Del. C. 1401 et seq., 
which sets out procedural and hearing requirements 
which must be met to terminate properly the employ­
ment of a public school teacher, were not applicable 
to the separate contracts for coaching athletic teams. 
Decision 
The failure to grant a new contract for 
coaching to the plaintiff is not a matter within 
the coverage of the Professional Negotiation Agreement 
The conclusion here reached under the terms of the 
129x, . , Ibid. 
130T,.j Ibid. 
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Professional Negotiation Agreement seems to be in 
accord with long established custom which tradi­
tionally allows much more flexibility in the 
selection of coaches than would be allowed in the 
hiring and firing of teachers. If coaches could 
not be relieved of their duties at the end of their 
contract period without specific charges and a 
formal public hearing or other special formalities 
usually afforded in connection with teaching con­
tracts, a new and very interesting field of contract 
law might develop. However, it is the court's opinion that 
the Professional Negotiation Agreement was not designed 
to open up this new field and that it imposed no re­
strictions on the selection of extracurricular ath­
letic coaches for a new season after existing contracts 
131 
had been completed. 
Summary judgment for the defendants is entered. 
132 
It is so ordered. 
131 
° Ibid., p. 293. 
132 , . , 
Ibid. 
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Discussion 
The board of education in connection with 
awarding of contracts, for extracurricular coaching, 
is not required by statute or constitution to hold 
133 
hearings. 
"Teacher," as defined in statute setting out 
procedural and hearing requirements which must be 
met to properly terminate employment of a public 
school teacher, and which does not include foot­
ball coach while acting as such, parallels the 
meaning of "classroom teacher" as used in Profes­
sional Negotiation Agreement entered into between 
the board of education and the bargaining unit 
representing teachers of the school district and 
which provides for certain grievance procedures for 
alleged reduction in rank of teacher and thus addi­
tional duties undertaken by athletic coaches are not an 
integral part of classroom instruction as to which 
133Ibid., p. 290. 
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teacher has special and unique procedural rights 
134 
under such agreement. 
The board of education's failure to grant a new 
contract for coaching to assistant athletic coach 
was not a matter within coverage of professional 
negotiations agreement, which was entered into be­
tween the board and bargaining unit representing 
teachers of school district and which provided, 
inter alia, that alleged reduction in rank or com­
pensation or deprivation of any professional advan­
tage without just cause of teacher by board of edu­
cation shall be subject to grievance procedures 
set forth in agreement, and thus coach was not 
entitled to such grievance procedures upon board's 
135 
consideration of coaching contract. 
School Directors of District U-46 v. Kossoff 
419 N.E. 2d 658 (1981). 
Facts 
Improperly suspended physical education in­
structors, who were also football, baseball, and 
track coaches under separate contracts, appealed 
134 , 
Ibid. 
135T, Ibid. 
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from judgment entered by the Circuit Court, Kane 
County, John A. Krause, J., affirming hearing 
officer's decision to reinstate instructors with 
back pay to their tenured teaching positions but 
declining to compel school district to reassign 
them to their coaching positions or direct reim-
13 6 
bursement for lost coaching salaries. 
In this appeal the court will consider whether 
section 24-12 of the School Code of 1961 (111. Rev. 
Stat. 1979, ch. 122, par. 24-12) requires a'school 
teacher who is reinstated to his tenured teaching 
position following review of his dismissal or sus­
pension must also be reassigned to a second,•extra­
curricular position which had also been held by him 
137 
pursuant to a separate contract. 
In July 1979, charges of immoral conduct were 
brought by plaintiff, School Directors of District 
U-46, Counties of Kane, Dupage and Cook and State of 
Illinois, against defendants, Eric M. Anderson, 
13 6 
School Directors of District U-46 v. Kossoff, 
419 N.E. 2d 658 (1981) . 
137 
Ibid., p. 659. 
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Rodney Bixby and John Newcomb. Defendants were 
suspended without pay from their high school 
teaching positions and extracurricular assign­
ments by the school board, and it also sought 
dismissal of defendants and requested appoint­
ment of an independent hearing officer as re­
quired by statute. (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 122, 
par. 24-12.) By agreement of the parties, the 
cases were consolidated for hearing before the 
hearing officer, defendant Sinclair Kossoff. De­
fendant Anderson had been hired as a physical edu­
cation instructor at Elgin Larkin High School and 
was assistant varsity football coach and head 
varsity baseball coach there at the time these 
charges were filed. Defendants Bixby and Newcomb 
had been employed as physical education instructors 
at Streamwood High School since 1977 and 1968 re­
spectively. At the time they were suspended, 
Newcomb was head football coach and Bixby assistant 
varsity football coach and a track coach at the 
, . 138 
school. 
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The hearing officer rendered a decision for 
defendants, stating the school district had failed 
to prove defendants guilty of the charges against 
them by a preponderance of the evidence. He ordered 
defendants "restored to the same positions as, or 
to positions substantially similar to, the ones 
held by them prior to their suspension" and "made 
whole for all monies and other employment benefits 
139 
lost as a result of their suspension." 
Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the 
circuit court of Kane County seeking administrative 
review of the hearing officer's order. (111. Rev. 
Stat. 1979, ch. 122, pars. 24-12, 24-16.) The 
circuit court affirmed the hearing officer's de­
cision to reinstate defendants and directed that 
they each be reinstated with back pay to their 
tenured teaching positions. However, the trial 
judge determined that defendants' extracurricular 
coaching activities were not protected by the school 
code and that any remedy they may have had regarding 
139T,. , Ibid. 
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their coaching positions was thus outside the scope 
of administrative review. The court accordingly 
declined to compel the school district to reassign 
defendants to their coaching positions or direct 
140 
reimbursement for lost coaching salaries. 
Defendants contend the tenure provisions of the 
school code require that upon being reinstated to 
their teaching positions the school board also was 
required to assign them to their former coaching 
positions or substantially similar ones. They sug­
gest first that they were tenured as coaches and 
should have been reinstated to these tenured posi­
tions. Defendants also argue they were specifically 
hired as coaches and only incidentally as teachers and 
that therefore they were entitled to reassignment to 
teaching and coaching positions substantially similar 
to the ones they held prior to their suspension. 
Plaintiff maintains that defendants were not tenured 
as coaches. Plaintiff also contends the statute pro­
viding for reinstatement of previously suspended 
181 
teachers requires the board to reassign each only 
to a substantially similar "position," but that the 
term "position" only includes "primary curricular" 
job descriptions and does not include extracurri-
141 
cular assignments such as coaching. 
Decision 
It appears defendants can prevail only if the 
amendatory language added effective September 9, 
1979, requiring each of them to be reassigned "to 
a position substantially similar to the one which 
that teacher held prior to that teacher's suspension 
or dismissal" means defendants must now also be re­
assigned to those non-tenured extracurricular posi­
tions they held under separate contracts. We con­
clude the General Assembly did not intend the con­
struction advocated by defendants. Had the legis­
lature intended to grant teachers the right to re­
assignment in their extracurricular positions, it 
could easily have chosen more specific language, 
not framed in singular terms of a position similar 
to the one which a teacher previously held. To hold 
141Ibid., pp. 659-660. 
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otherwise would require an overly expansive reading 
of the statute in question. The teacher tenure pro­
visions have been held to be in derogation of common 
law and must be strictly construed in favor of the 
142 
school district. 
The court concludes the "position substantially sim­
ilar" language of the statute does not compel plaintiff to 
reassign defendants to the athletic coaching duties 
held by them under separate employment contracts. 
These contracts and any right to recovery of damages 
under them were not before the trial court on admin­
istrative review and we will not consider them further 
143 
in this case. 
The Appellate Court, Nash, J., held that: (1) in­
structors were not tenured under school code as coaches 
and therefore they were only tenured physical educa­
tion "teachers" as such term was used in section of 
code governing rights of tenured teachers to reinstate­
ment following improper suspension, and (2) amendatory 
language to such section of code, requiring improperly 
suspended teacher to be reassigned "to a position sub­
stantially similar to the one which that teacher held 
142Ibid., p. 661. 
Ibid. 
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prior to that teacher's suspension or dismissal" 
did not compel reassignment of instructors to 
athletic coaching duties held by them under separ-
144 
ate employment contracts. 
Discussion 
Football, baseball, and track coaches, who 
were suspended without pay from their high school 
teaching positions and extracurricular assignments 
for allegedly immoral conduct, were not tenured under 
school code as coaches and therefore were only ten­
ured physical education "teachers" as such term was 
used in section of school code governing rights of 
tenured "teachers" to reinstatement following im­
proper suspension, where athletic coaches were not 
required to be certified by law as coaches, and code 
defined "teacher" as school district employees regu-
145 
larly required to be certified. 
The General Assembly's intent in amendatory 
language to statute governing rights of tenured 
teachers to reinstatement following improper suspen­
sion, requiring that improperly suspended teachers be 
144 
Ibid., p. 658. 
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reassigned "to a position substantially similar to 
the one which that teacher held prior to that teacher's 
suspension or dismissal," was not that physical educa­
tion instructors, who were also football, baseball, 
and track coaches, had to be reassigned to athletic 
coaching duties held by them under separate employ­
ment contracts upon determination that school district 
had failed to prove them guilty of allegedly immoral 
146 
conduct by preponderance of evidence. 
Slockett v. Iowa Valley 
Community School District 
359 N.W. 2d 446 (1984) 
Facts 
Following termination of teacher's coaching job 
but not her teaching position, she brought a declar­
atory judgment action asserting contractual rights 
147 
to the coaching position. 
The question here is whether a coaching contract 
created a tenured teaching position. The trial court 
held the position was an extra-duty assignment, unpro-
146Ibid., pp. 658-659. 
147 
Slockett V. Iowa Valley Community School 
District, 359 N.W. 2d 446 (1984). 
185 
148 tected by Iowa's teacher tenure statutes. 
Plaintiff was first employed by defendant dis­
trict as a teacher for the 1973-74 school year in 
September, 1973. According to the contract, plain­
tiff was hired both as a physical education instruc­
tor and junior high basketball coach. A similar con­
tract was entered for the succeeding year. The agree­
ment was different for the 1975-76 school year when 
two documents were executed. One, entitled "agree­
ment to modify teacher's continuing contract," pro­
vided: 
Duties, Elementary Physical Education 
Instructor; Duty is 4/5 of full-time 
position; schedule to be arranged by 
principal. Activity or additional 
assignments to be made by administra­
tion as needed. Salary adjustments, 
assignments, or activity to be made 
according to extra-duty pay schedule. 
(Emphasis added.)149 
Under the other document, called a "coaching con­
tract," plaintiff undertook a varsity coaching 
assignment. It provided: 
Witnesseth: That party of the second 
part [the district] hereby appoints the 
party of the first part [plaintiff] to 
the position of head girls' varsity 
basketball coach and assistant girls' 
varsity track coach for the 1976-77 
school year. (Emphasis added. 
148Ibid. p. 447 
1 49t, . , Ibid. 
150-,., 
Ibid. 
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Plaintiff continued her employment under this 
same arrangement for the 1976-77 and 1977-78 school 
years. Each time two separate documents were again 
, 151 
signed. 
In February of 1979, the defendant school board 
voted not to offer plaintiff the head girls' varsity 
basketball coaching position for the 1979-80 school 
year. There was no attempt to terminate her other 
duties and plaintiff has continued as a physical edu­
cation teacher and junior high girls' track coach. 
It was stipulated that plaintiff's varsity coaching 
position was terminated without affording her the 
procedural protections provided for termination of 
teacher contracts. 
For the entire period plaintiff's compensation 
for the teaching position has been determined by a 
salary schedule contained in the district's master 
agreement with the teachers. Her compensation for 
the coaching position was determined by an extra-
Ibid. 
152t, . , Ibid. 
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duty pay schedule, which is a part of the same agree-
153 
ment. 
Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment ac­
tion asserting contractual rights to the head coaching 
position. She claims the district, having failed to 
terminate her coaching position in accordance with 
the statutory procedures, was without power to do so 
unilaterally. The trial court, ruling on the dis­
trict's motion for summary judgment, determined that 
the head coaching position was a mere extra-duty 
assignment and did not qualify as a tenured teaching 
position. Hence, it ruled the district was not obli­
gated to comply with the statutory requirements for 
154 
terminating tenured positions. 
Decision 
The administrative requirement that coaches must 
be certified does not carry teachers' tenure rights 
into coaching assignments. Teacher coaches, under 
the statute here involved, were tenured as teachers 
but there was nothing that prohibited them from 
Ibid. 
154Ibid., pp. 447-448, 
agreeing to serve as coaches as an extra-duty assign­
ment. The statutory definition of a teacher within 
.section 279.13, in extending the definition to "all 
•certified employees of a school district" included 
this plaintiff. But, as a teacher, she was free to 
contract as she did to enter upon coaching duties by 
155 
way of the separate extra-duty assignment. 
The trial court was correct in determining the 
coaching position involved here was, by agreement of 
the parties, a mere extra-duty assignment. As such, 
it was not a tenured teaching position. Summary 
i 
judgment was properly entered against the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court, Harris, J., held that school 
district was not obligated to comply with the statu­
tory requirements for terminating tenured positions, 
since the coaching position was, by agreement of the 
157 parties, a mere extra-duty assignment. 
Discussion 
Statutory amendment providing that coaching 
positions are to be provided by a contract which is 
155Ibid., p. 450, 
156T, . , Ibid. 
157T, . , Ibid. 
separate from any teaching contract and that such 
an extracurricular contract may be terminated at 
end of a school year pursuant to specified statu­
tory provisions served to alter the law, rather 
than being a legislative explanation of the prior 
158 
law. 
Legislature intended for tenure to attach to 
159 
teaching position, not coaching assignment. 
Administrative requirement that coaches must 
be certified does not carry teachers' tenure rights 
into coaching assignments.1^ 
Where coaching position was, by agreement of 
teacher and school district, a mere extra-duty 
assignment, it was not a tenured teaching position; 
thus, school district was not obligated to comply 
with the statutory requirements for terminating 
tenured positions when it terminated teacher's 
. 161 
position as coach. 
When law is amended as to minor details and 
some disputed question is made clear by amendment, 
the amendment can be said to cast light on legis-
16 2 
lature's earlier intent. 
158Ibid., pp. 446-447. 
159 , . , 
Ibid. 
160.,., 
Ibid. 
161T, . , Ibid. 
*^Ibid., p. 446. 
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It is fundamental prerogative of a legislature 
to declare what law shall be, but of courts to de-
u . .. . 163 clare what it is. 
Hosaflook v. Nestor, 
346 S.E. 2d 798 (1986). 
Facts 
A coach was transferred to a teaching position. 
The Upshur County Circuit Court reinstated transfer 
following school superintendent's determination that 
transfer had violated coach's rights/16^ 
This is an appeal by Danny Hosaflook from a final 
order entered in the Circuit Court of Upshur County. 
The circuit court granted a writ of certiorari and 
reversed a ruling of the State Superintendent of 
Schools who had found that the Board of Education 
of Upshur County denied Hosaflook certain procedural 
rights when it voted to transfer him from the posi­
tion of teacher/head football coach/head physical 
conditioning coach to the position of teacher. The 
circuit court reinstated the board's decision to 
transfer Hosaf look. 
Ibid. 
164 
Hosaflook v. Nestor, 346 S.E. 2d 798 (1986). 
165t, . , Ibid. 
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The appellant, Danny Hosaflook, is a tenured 
teacher at Buckhannon-Upshur High School in Upshur 
County. He has taught driver education at the 
high school since 1977. He previously taught at 
Buckhannon-Upshur Junior High School. Beginning 
in 1981, Hosaflook took on extracurricular duties 
as head football coach and head physical conditioning 
coach. In accordance with W. Va. Code, 18A-4-16 
(1982), he entered into an employment contract 
separate from the contract for his regular teaching 
.  1 6 6  
assignment. 
By letter, dated December 18, 1984, the Super­
intendent of Schools of Upshur County, Edwin M. 
Nestor, informed Hosaflook that Nestor intended to 
recommend to the Board of Education that he be 
transferred from his position of teacher/head foot­
ball coach/head physical conditioning coach at 
Buckhannon-Upshur High School to the position of 
teacher, at the same school, for the 1985-86 aca­
demic year. The county superintendent also informed 
Ibid. 
167Ibid., pp. 799-800. 
Hosaflook that a hearing on the proposed transfer 
would be scheduled and that Hosaflook had the option 
of having the hearing open to the public or held in 
executive session. A statement of reasons was 
appended to the letter. The action of the county 
superintendent followed a series of five board of 
education meetings held after the end of the 1984 
167 
football season. 
A two-day hearing was held -in January, 1985. 
At the request of the appellant, it was closed to 
the public. After hearing the testimony, the 
board voted 4 to 1 to approve the superintendent's 
recommendation not to renew the appellant's coaching 
.  1 6 8  
contract. 
On Hosaflook's appeal, the state superintendent 
specifically found that no written evaluations, in 
accordance with State School Board Policy 5300 (6) (a 
were made. The state superintendent determined that 
the requirements of W. Va. Code, 18-A-2-7 (1977) and 
Policy 5300 (6) (a) must be met prior to the termin­
ation of a coaching assignment. Without deciding 
167Ibid., pp. 799-800. 
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whether the procedural requirements of Code, 
18-A--2-7 had been satisfied, the state superin­
tendent tackled the substance of the hearing and 
concluded that the reasons given for nonrenewal 
of the appellant's coaching contract were not ade­
quately proved. Consequently, the state super­
intendent ruled that the appellant was entitled 
to reinstatement.* 
The county superintendent petitioned the 
Circuit Court of Upshur County for a writ of 
certiorari. Upon review of the record, the court 
reversed the state superintendent's decision, con­
cluding that neither Code, 18A-2-7 nor Policy 5300 
(6) (a) is applicable in a case involving non-
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renewal of a contract for extracurricular duties. 
Decision 
Failure by any board of education to follow the 
evaluation procedure in West Virginia Board of Edu­
cation Policy No. 5300 (6) (a) prohibits such board 
from discharging, demoting or transferring an em­
ployee for reasons having to do with prior misconduct 
1 69t, . , Ibid. 
170T, . , Ibid. 
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or incompetency that has not been called to the 
attention of the employee through evaluation, and 
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which is correctable. 
Even if the procedures followed in this case 
arguably complied in many respects with the notice 
and hearing requirements of W. Va. Code, 18A-2-7 
(1977), the failure to evaluate the appellant and 
to afford him an opportunity to improve, according 
to the mandate of Policy 5300 (6) (a), entitles the 
appellant to reinstatement to his position of foot-
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ball coach at Buckhannon-Upshur High School. 
It is unnecessary for the court to determine wheth­
er evidence adduced at the hearing sufficiently proved 
the charges against the appellant. See Smith v. 
Board of Education of County of Logan, supra, 341 S.E. 
2d at 690. The evaluation process, pursuant to 
Policy 5300 (6) (a) is a critical part of any dis­
ciplinary transfer procedure under W. Va. Code, 
18A-2-7 (1977). See Holland v. Board of Education 
of Raleigh County, —W. Va.—, 327 S.E. 2d 155 (1985). 
Failure to follow the evaluation process is a fatal 
*^Ibid., p. 801. 
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Ibid., p. 802 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals held 
that: (1) statutory procedural protections applied 
to nonrenewal of contract for extracurricular duties 
and (2) coach was entitled to reinstatement because 
he had not been afforded evaluation and opportunity 
. . 174 
to improve. 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the 
Circuit Court of Upshur County was reversed, and 
this case is remanded for entry of an order 
affirming the decision of the state superintendent.1 
Discussion 
The coach who was transferred to teaching posi­
tion based on alleged incompetency without evalua­
tion or opportunity to improve in violation of state 
educational policy was entitled to reinstatement, 
notwithstanding the district's substantial compli-
17 6 
ance with statutory procedural requirements. 
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Ibid., p. 798. 
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Ibid., p. 802. 
176Ibid., p. 798. 
The school board could not terminate the 
teacher's extracurricular coaching contract with­
out granting him protections afforded by statute 
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and state educational policy. 
177 , 
Ibid. 
SUMMARY 
An analysis of the major court decisions re­
lated to the removal of a teacher/coach from his 
coaching position indicates that most are related 
to dismissal, tenure, divisible contracts and 
defamation of character. Coaches will also go to 
court to resolve discrimination issues associated 
with racial or sexual bias. 
In this study, many of these new forces in 
American society have been discussed as they re­
late to teacher/coaches and their dismissal. The 
questioning attitude of the public, court decisions, 
legislative actions, and the increasing awareness 
of the constitutional rights of individuals have 
led to more and more discussion and concern re­
garding dismissal issues. 
The issue of due process appears in the courts 
more than any other. The important legal point to 
be remembered is whether or not due process is re­
quired by law and whether it is provided. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was designed to identify and to analyze 
historical and legal aspects of the dismissal of a 
teacher/coach from only his interscholastic coaching 
responsibilities. In order to place into perspective 
the position that most teacher/coaches occupy in today's 
society a review of related literature was conducted. An 
analysis of the literature revealed that most teacher/ 
coaches are constantly scrutinized by members of the 
community who feel qualified to approach, criticize 
and ultimately request the dismissal of a coach not 
meeting their expectations. Therefore, decision 
makers at public schools should have information of 
a historical and legal nature to gain insight for 
future directions in teacher/coach issues which im­
pact on potential dismissal. Also, teacher/coaches 
should have a source of information which delineates 
individual rights and the employer's compelling inter­
est in education. 
Prior to the seventies and eighties, comparatively 
speaking, there was not a great deal of judicial activity 
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related to teacher/coach dismissal. The review of 
literature on teacher/coach dismissal revealed sev­
eral cases decided by state courts but made no men­
tion of any litigation by the United States Supreme 
Court regarding the issue. 
SUMMARY 
In this study, the many forces currently affect­
ing teacher/coaches and their dismissal which previ­
ously have not been present in American society were 
discussed. The questioning attitude of the public, 
court decisions, legislative actions, and the increas­
ing awareness of the constitutional rights of indiv­
iduals have led to more and more discussion and con­
cern regarding dismissal issues. As the issues in­
crease, relative to what constitutes valid qualifica­
tions to teach and coach and who determines whether or 
not an individual has the appropriate qualifications, 
the agencies and entities charged with the responsibility 
of teacher/coach employment - dismissal must be aware of 
the legal implications. 
Because of the highly visible position teacher/ 
coaches occupy, they are very likely to receive more 
praise or criticism than the regular classroom teacher. 
Some teacher/coaches are very effective in the dual role 
while others have difficulty managing the conflicts often 
caused by trying to be successful in both. 
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A review of the literature revealed that most 
teacher/coaches are employed on two separate con­
tracts, one for the teaching position and another 
for coaching. This allows the school system to 
void the coaching contract at the end of the 
school year for little or no reason. 
With the increase in litigation in the United 
States more and more cases associated with athletics 
have made their way into the courts. Most of them 
deal with employment issues. Teacher/coaches now 
go to court seeking decisions related to such issues 
as: tenure, divisible and indivisible contracts, 
defamation of character, and various forms of dis­
crimination. 
In the course of reviewing the literature, it 
also became apparent how important proper due pro­
cess is with regard to the professional evaluation 
and ultimate possible dismissal of a teacher/coach. 
Descriptive terms related to teacher/coach em­
ployment, such as secondary school teacher/coach, 
teaching contract, divisible contract, indivisible 
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contract, extracurricular assignment, teacher 
tenure, due process, racial discrimination, 
and sex discrimination vary little in mean­
ing from state to state. All of the above 
terms have important implications for 
teacher/coach employment - dismissal issues. 
In the introductory material to Chap­
ter I, some very basic questions relating 
to the topic of this dissertation were 
proposed. Discussion developed around 
those six questions will provide insight 
concerning teacher/coach dismissal from the coaching 
position only. 
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1. What are the major legal issues regarding 
teacher/coaching assignments? 
The major legal issues regarding teacher/ 
coaching assignments are those questions raised by 
divisible contracts, teacher tenure laws, evalua­
tion, and reasonableness of the requirement of 
assignment. 
In most instances coaches in the public schools 
are employed on contracts that are separate from their 
teaching contracts. Usually, when these types of con­
tracts exist, the school system can void a coaching 
contract at the end of a school year for little or 
no reason. Today, the important legal point becomes 
whether or not due process is required by law and 
whether it was afforded. 
Many coaches argue that as teacher/coaches 
teacher tenure laws should protect them in both 
capacities. More and more when they are dismissed 
from their coaching duties, they challenge the school 
officials' power to terminate the contract, and quite 
often the court is asked to decide the issue. 
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Many coaches have difficulty in performing in 
an outstanding manner with all of the pressures 
they face, and excellent dual role performance is 
often unrealistic for them. Often when this occurs 
many coaches receive less than favorable perfor­
mance evaluations either as a teacher or coach. 
Again, the question of due process is significant. 
The question of non-classroom assignments often 
comes up in the court room. Whether or not a teacher 
may legally refuse to perform extra duties usually 
depends on the reasonableness of the requirement. 
In most cases extracurricular assignments will be 
upheld by the courts when they are fair and reason­
able and are related to school programs. 
2. Which of these issues are most often included 
in court cases related to the dismissal of a teacher/ 
coach from his coaching responsibilities? 
Certainly the issue of due process tends to appear 
in court often. It is reasonable to assume that Tate 
and Genco are examples of coaches seeking to be heard 
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and requesting the opportunity to not be dismissed 
without due notice and a specific cause. 
In Tate the court pointed out that a high 
school athletic coach is not a teacher within the 
meaning of the Teacher Tenure Act, and where the 
teacher's divisible coaching contract was not 
renewed, the act did not require the school board 
to provide a due process hearing. The Genco case 
illustrates that the creation and abolition of 
positions is recognized as1 a power of school boards; 
however, the board must act intelligently, impartially 
and with sound discretion. 
The question of discrimination has also appeared 
in the court room too. In Grebin the court was asked 
to decide whether her sex discrimination charges 
against the board of education were valid. The court 
ruled that Grebin was unable to present sufficient 
evidence of willful discrimination. In Harris, a 
race discrimination case, the court determined that 
the appellant was not a victim of hiring or promotion 
discrimination because of race. An important point 
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in this case was that the board of education had 
to produce evidence that the teacher/coach was re­
jected or someone else was preferred for legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons. 
Coaches tenured as teachers often claim ten­
ure in the athletic position as well. In Chiodo, 
the court found that the legislature, in defining 
teacher tenure, did not include coaches within the 
definition of teacher; consequently a tenured 
teacher does not automatically establish tenure 
as a coach also. 
3. Which of the legal principles established by 
the "Landmark" decisions regarding teacher dismissal 
are applicable to legal issues involving dismissal 
from coaching responsibilities? 
Questions of individual freedoms are answered 
as each relates to the First Amendment. The Fourteenth 
Amendment extends to citizens of the states all pro­
tections and rights of the Constitution and its 
Amendments. 
The basic questions of federal constitutionality 
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must apply equally to state courts and legisla­
tures as statutes and legal issues are developed 
and litigated. 
The vast majority of lawsuits in which coaches 
are involved focus on some area of employment. 
Legal principles that receive most of the atten­
tion are due process, discrimination, and defama­
tion of character. 
4. Based on the results of recent court cases, 
what specific issues related to teacher dismissal from 
coaching assignments are being litigated? 
The issue of due process appears to be litigated 
more than any other. There continue to be coaches 
who feel that their dismissal has caused them to 
have been defamed or that their employer has been 
unreasonable in his treatment of them. 
Coaches without teacher tenure are also 
appearing in the courts. When they are dismissed as 
a teacher and coach without due process, they want 
to know why. In Abel1 two probationary teachers 
and assistant football coaches who were terminated 
by the Board of Education without being given any 
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reasons brought action for reinstatement, back 
pay, and actual and punitive damages. Though 
the court found for the board it established a signifi­
cant position about the dismissal of probationary 
teachers when it decided that boards of education must 
be forthright about their actions. If a proba­
tionary teacher is not renewed, those who have 
made that decision simply must have a valid basis. 
More and more coaches contend that tenure 
as a teacher should also provide similar protection 
for their coaching position. Generally, unless 
the contract provides the same protection for 
coaching that it provides for the teaching con­
tract, the position provides no real property right. 
5. Can any specific trends be determined from 
an analysis of the court cases? 
Although there have not been any decisions re­
garding the dismissal of a teacher/coach from the 
United States Supreme Court, an analysis of other 
court decisions establishes a pattern of behavior. 
The pattern is one of support for appropriate due 
process. To date, no one has challenged the de­
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cisions of state and federal district courts, when 
they have found for the employer. 
The Constitution of the United States requires 
that the general welfare of the population be a 
continuing concern of government. The First and 
Fourteenth Amendments are ever present reminders 
of the rights and protections due our American cit­
izens and Federal and State courts are established 
to make certain those freedoms remain secure. 
Divisible contracts appear to remain predom­
inant. Most boards of education simply wish to 
make the coaching duties independent of the teaching 
responsibilities. This allows the responsibilities 
to be addressed independently. 
It is clear that when a teacher/coach challenges 
his dismissal in a court room and the court finds 
that the board and school administrators have pro­
vided satisfactory due process, the court will find 
for the employer. 
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6. Based on the established legal precedents what 
are the legally acceptable criteria for the dismissal of 
a teacher/coach from his coaching responsibilities? 
Based on review of the literature and court 
cases, the legally acceptable criteria for the dis­
missal of a teacher/coach from his coaching position 
are those measures established by the courts which 
address contracts and due process. It should be 
emphasized that appropriate due process is the key 
issue and decisions of the future will continue to 
hinge on how adequately it has been afforded. 
The Fourteenth amendment due process clause 
guarantees a coach the right to know why he is 
being dismissed and the opportunity to convince 
school officials before they dismiss him that they 
are making a mistake, that their reasons for dis­
missing him are either not supported by facts or less 
compelling than they think. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The legality of the dismissal of a teacher/ 
coach from his coaching position has become a more 
litigous question in recent years. During the 
sixties, seventies, and now into the eighties the 
courts have handed down more teacher/coach dismissal 
decisions than in the previous decades of the 
twentieth century. The level of legal action 
now appearing in the courts is indicative of 
the times and reflects the urgency of the need 
for appropriate professional activity between 
boards of education and teacher/coaches. 
After an extensive study of the historical 
and legal aspects of teacher/coach dismissal, 
the writer has drawn the following conclusions: 
1. All indications lead one to believe 
that there will be continuous legal 
activity concerning the employment 
of teacher/coaches and their dismissal. 
2. The nature of the educational function 
does not lend itself to new areas of 
legal questioning; therefore, it is 
predictable that the same attempts 
to challenge due process will con­
tinue to appear. 
3. Forces such as the questioning atti­
tude of the public and an increased 
awareness of individual constitu­
tional rights are affecting teacher 
rights and working conditions in 
America today as never before. 
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4. Litigation of teacher/coach dismissal 
issues in North Carolina has been in­
frequent. To date, there are less 
than five on record. 
5. In nineteen states teacher/coaches do 
not have due process as coaches. 
6. As of 1985 thirty-four states do not 
grant teacher/coaches tenure as a 
coach. 
7. Intentional discrimination must be 
proved when a disparate racial or 
sexual impact is achieved when 
hiring, promoting, transferring, or 
firing employees. 
8. Most states have basically followed 
the same pattern in utilizing div­
isible contracts for teacher/coaches. 
That is, separate contracts are signed 
for the teaching and coaching respon­
sibilities . 
9. Due process must be adhered to in 
teacher/coach dismissal proceedings. 
Recommendations For Future Studies 
It is important for decision makers to obtain appro­
priate information that will facilitate decisions and 
policies as they formulate appropriate personnel employ­
ment — dismissal guidelines. The important thing to 
remember is that these guidelines must be educationally 
sound. 
These guidelines must address the frequently liti­
gated issues, i.e., tenure, character defamation, dis­
crimination, divisible contract and due process. 
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It is recommended to future researchers that 
attention be given to the issue of due process and 
how it is administered within different school dis­
tricts in and around the United States. 
As times continue to change decision makers must 
be aware of employment issues. They must make every 
effort to be informed on issues that are addressed by 
others, especially those in the courts. This re­
searcher strongly recommends decision makers to re­
main informed by continued study and attention to 
employee-employer issues. 
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